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ABSTRACT
Extant literature across various research disciplines has investigated the influence of a
firm’s technological innovation on its performance. However, the findings on this
relationship remain inconclusive as it is subject to many strategic and environmental
factors. In this dissertation, the relationship between a firm’s technological innovation
and performance is evaluated. Additionally, this relationship is examined in the presence
of various contextual factors.
In the first study, meta-analysis is utilized to quantitatively aggregate existing
empirical research in this domain. Cultural and institutional aspects of the nation in
which the firm operates are examined for their potential in explaining variability within
the technology innovation-performance relationship. Results indicate that better
performance outcomes are observed when innovation occurs in those nations that have
lower inclination to avoid uncertainty and/or collectivistic attitudes. Counter-intuitively,
performance suffers when innovation occurs in nations with stronger patent protection
framework.
It has been increasingly demonstrated that research and development related
innovation-knowledge spillovers can impact the performance of both the innovative firm
as well as its competitor/s. In the second study, a contribution to the spillover literature is
made by exploring spillovers of operational knowledge, referred to as operational
spillovers. Specifically, spillovers related to inventory, sourcing lead time, and volume
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flexibility are examined. The results suggest that operational spillovers only help firms
that need additional operational knowledge resources. A novel and counterintuitive
finding is that the financial performance of all other firms is negatively impacted by
learning via operational spillovers. These results suggest that operational spillovers
should be sought only in specific circumstances, and otherwise avoided.
In the third and final study, the financial implications of operational spillovers
from the industry leaders and laggards are examined within the context of the
environment in which the firm operates. A firm’s external operating environment largely
determines the degree of uncertainty confronted in its day-to-day operations. Specifically,
munificence, dynamism and complexity are examined as distinct components of
environmental uncertainty. The final study answers how these dimensions of industrylevel environmental uncertainty enable or prohibit the successful exploitation of
operational spillovers.
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CHAPTER 1
Overview
1.1 Introduction
Technological innovation is a complex and multidimensional construct, that refers to
innovations occurring on the operating side of an organization, for example, introduction
of new/improved products and/or processes. The importance of technological innovation
as a core capability of a firm to sustain competitive advantage is well documented in extant
literature. However, the empirical findings on this relationship remain inconclusive, and
consequently this dissertation focuses on examining ways in which innovation benefits
firms that make those strategic investments, how the ability of a firm to enjoy these benefits
is impacted by the action of other firms to which it is connected, and whether environmental
effects tied to a given industry have a bearing on these relationships. Three inter-related,
yet distinct studies, are structured to fulfill these objectives, and are described next.

1.2 Dissertation Organization
In Chapter 2 of the dissertation, an attempt is made to reconcile the mixed empirical results
on the overarching relationship of technological innovation and firm performance. Thirteen
major journals from the field of Operations Management (OM), Economics, Finance,
Strategy, and Management were searched with the goal of collecting relevant studies that
had empirically examined the said relationship. This inter-disciplinary literature review
resulted in a sample of 28 published studies. By employing a multi-variate meta-analytic
1

methodology, the findings on the focal relationship from each of the studies in the sample
were quantitatively compiled and coded. Based on a meta-analysis of 132 effect sizes
obtained from these 28 studies, the overall relationship between a firm’s technological
innovation and performance is shown to be significant and positive. Second, empirical
support for the moderating influence of cross-cultural and institutional differences on the
said relationship is also established. When innovation occurs in those nations that have
lower propensity to avoid uncertainty and/or collectivistic attitudes, better performance
outcomes are observed. In contrast, performance suffers when technological innovation
occurs in nations that have stronger patent protection. The reasons for these expected as
well as counter-intuitive results are discussed.
While Chapter 2 includes both the manufacturing and service sector firms, the
subsequent chapters focus exclusively on the manufacturing sector where the notions of
supply chains and inter-firm connections have been better established. In Chapter 3 of the
dissertation, the context of spillovers is introduced into the evaluation of the focal
relationship. There exists empirical evidence that firm’s performance sensitivity to its
internal innovation activities is also impacted by innovation carried out by its opponent
firm (s) (Cohen et al., 2000; Heeley et al., 2007). Firms tend to exploit the innovationknowledge resources that leak out from other innovative firms, and thereby imitate what
its competitors are doing well. Such leakage of innovation-knowledge resources is referred
to as Spillovers (Jaffe, 1998). Exploitation of spillovers brings down the innovation-related
investment costs, as well as reduces the risk of failure because firms only use spillover
knowledge from successful innovators. This expropriation can augment the rival firm’s
profitability, but would also tend to diminish the innovative firm’s profitability. Several
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studies have empirically examined spillovers and their impact on firm performance using
research and development (R&D) as the measure of innovation-knowledge spillovers. This
dissertation for the first time introduces the notion of spillovers as they relate specifically
to operational knowledge. These operational spillovers are characterized in terms of
inventory, sourcing lead time, and volume flexibility. Using the resource-based view
(RBV) of a firm, the impact of operational spillovers on firm performance is evaluated to
empirically show that firms are heterogenous in nature when it comes to benefitting from
operational spillovers. Even more interestingly, operational spillovers financially benefit
only those firms which have undeveloped operational capabilities. All other firms are
paradoxically hurt financially from operational spillovers.
In Chapter 4 of the dissertation, the focal relationship is evaluated in the context of
three industry-level environmental factors. The environment of the industry in which a firm
operates influences a firm’s strategic decisions, as well as its performance, and is broadly
categorized along three dimensions: munificence, dynamism, and complexity (Pagell and
Krause, 2004). Together, these three factors reflect the degree of uncertainty the firm faces
in their operating environment. Given that not all operational capabilities are equally
relevant and valuable under all operating conditions, the aim of this chapter is to identify
the external operating conditions that facilitate the reaping of financial benefits (penalties)
from operational spillovers.
Finally, this dissertation concludes in Chapter 5 with a summary of overarching
research findings, recommendations, potential limitations, and future research directions.
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CHAPTER 2
Relationship Between Technological Innovation and Firm Performance:
A Meta-Analytic Investigation
2.1

Introduction

A firm's initiatives for innovation have been argued by many to be the driving force behind
its success and growth (Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2010). Even during the 2008 financial
crisis, many US companies, while cutting costs in other areas, continued to invest in
research and development (R&D) (Scheck and Glader, 2009). In today’s competitive
market, start-ups can quickly replace incumbent firms if they do not strive to stay ahead of
the innovation curve. In the presence of globalization and technological advancements,
firms from emerging markets are steadily gaining dominance over their developed-country
counterparts simply by innovating (Shaughnessy, 2017). In brief, firms need to
continuously innovate to ensure competitive advantage and maintain their position in the
market (Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2010). However, some scholars argue against the
performance benefits of innovation primarily because of the inherent nature of innovation.
Arguably, performance returns to innovation are diminished because of the (a) associated
high investment costs to innovation, (b) uncertainty of returns to innovation (c) long delays
in reaping those returns, (d) difficulty of effectively measuring those returns, and (e)
perceived risk of failure by management, among others (Hall, 2010; Sood and Tellis, 2009).
On top of that, the inadequacy of the existing measures of innovation further
complicates the credibility of the empirical findings of the innovation→ performance link
4

(Zhang et al., 2012). To complicate the said relationship further, innovation does not occur
in a vacuum, and is affected by a host of environmental conditions (both internal as well
as external) (Zhang et al., 2012). Prior literature has attempted to evaluate how the
implementation of innovation is influenced by various factors such as the country of
operation and its culture (Power et al., 2010), environmental turbulence or uncertainty
(Jean et al., 2012), type of structure (mechanistic or organic), industrial network of
operation (Li and Atuahene‐Gima, 2002), supplier involvement (Jean et al., 2012; Song et
al., 2011), organizational size (Li and Atuahene‐Gima, 2002; McDermott and Prajogo,
2012), and organizational structure and processes (Jansen et al., 2006). The evaluation of
certain contextual factors (for example, cross-country differences) can get overwhelming
for traditional-style studies; due to methodological and sample size limitations. On the
other hand, a quantitative aggregation of all prior innovation-related studies using metaanalysis methodology affords one the possibility to examine the impact of such contextual
factors that would be difficult to examine otherwise. Specifically, in this chapter the
innovation→ performance link is examined under the lens of two such factors- the
institutional and the cultural environment of a nation within which a firm operates.
As mentioned earlier, numerous studies have shown that a firm’s working
environment (both internal and external) can enable or inhibit the performance benefits
from innovation activities (Heugens et al., 2009; Li et al., 2010; Oliver and Holzinger,
2008). First, the institution-based view suggests that firms enjoy greater performance
benefits to innovation activities if they operate in nations with stronger institutional
environments (Heugens et al., 2009). Two characteristics of a strong institutional
environment relevant to the area of innovation are (a) the level of financial development
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and market regulation, and (b) the strength of intellectual property rights (Claessens and
Tzioumis, 2006; Pisano, 2006; Varsakelis, 2001). Since innovation is a high-cost activity,
firms that operate in financially well-developed and well-regulated nations can be expected
to perform better. Additionally, firms that operate in nations with a strong legal framework
for protection of intellectual property are better able to monopolize the financial returns on
their innovative products. Second, both practicing managers and academic researchers
have emphasized the importance of cultural elements in influencing innovation (Power et
al., 2010; Steensma et al., 2000). In the context of innovation, the two most commonly
studied cultural elements are degree of individualism and uncertainty avoidance (Shane,
1993) and empirical results have been shown to vary across these two dimensions
(Rosenbusch et al., 2011). Consequently, using multivariate meta-analytical techniques
that have been specifically designed to capture and assess such conflicting relationships,
this chapter focuses on providing some resolution to this ongoing debate, as well as provide
contextual insights about performance sensitivity to innovation efforts. Therefore, this
chapter attempts to answer the following questions:
1. Do technological innovations enhance a firm’s outcomes?
2. Does the relationship between technological innovation and firm performance
differ across nations in terms of the extent of capital market regulatory-type
institutional context and the strength of intellectual property rights in a nation?
3. Does the relationship between technological innovation and firm performance
differ across nations in terms of uncertainty avoidance and degree of individualism?
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In section 2.2, the theoretical
rationale for the hypothesized relationships is presented, while section 2.3, provides an
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overview of the meta-analytic methodology and the procedure to select and code studies.
In sections 2.4 and 2.5, the results of this analysis and the implications of the findings are
discussed. Potential limitations, and suggestions for future work are discussed in the
concluding section of the chapter.

2.2
2.2.1

Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
Technological Innovation Construct

Prior research on innovation has categorized it in many ways. One of the most popular
typologies to date has been the distinction between “technological” and “administrative”
type of innovation (Damanpour et al., 2009). Administrative innovations are defined as
“those that occur in the administrative component and the social system of an
organization” while technological innovations, on the other hand, are defined as “those
that occur in the operating component and affect the technical system of an organization”
(Damanpour et al., 2009). Technological innovation is relevant in the context of Operations
Management (OM), since it comprises product innovation and process innovation in both
manufacturing as well as service industries. Product innovations are defined as those
innovations that result in the introduction of a new or significantly improved product.
Process innovations are defined as those innovations that result in the introduction of a new
or significantly improved process. For example, introducing advanced manufacturing
technologies or quality improvement programs can potentially enhance manufacturing
systems (Boyer et al., 1997; McAfee, 2002). Prior literature has argued that different
innovation types vary in their focus and outcomes (Damanpour et al., 2009). Most of the
studies in this area examine technological-innovation construct as such, and very few of
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them distinguish between product and process innovations. Hence, given the limitations of
the study sample, this chapter is restricted to the typology level of technological innovation.
The construct of technological innovation is multi-faceted in nature and to capture
it appropriately and adequately, remains an open research area. Thus far, researchers have
employed numerous measures, comprising both perceptual (Jansen et al., 2006) as well as
objective type. The objective measures include, but are not limited to, R&D expenditures
(Ettlie and Pavlou, 2006; Song et al., 2011), R&D intensity (Han et al., 2013), patent counts
(Durand et al., 2008; Zhao, 2009), patent citations (Zhao, 2009), new product introductions
(Girotra et al., 2007), product radicalness (Oke, 2007), innovation-related announcements
(Hendricks and Singhal, 2008), and innovation awards (Zhang et al., 2012). All these
existing measures of technological innovation offer their own set of contributions and
drawbacks (Zhang et al., 2012). For example, the most frequently used measure of
innovation in empirical research is R&D spending. As a financial measure, R&D spending
can assist in the comparison of firms in terms of spending levels as a percentage of firm
sales, and makes the argument that a firm that spends more also innovates more. However,
R&D fails to capture a firm’s internal capabilities to innovate. The R&D-spending measure
incorrectly assumes that firms are homogenous in nature and that any two firms would
perform identically at a given level of R&D. Recent research has shown that firms in fact
differ in their abilities to innovate (Knott, 2008). In addition, innovation is not solely based
on high amounts of R&D investment, but also on the working environment within a firm,
for example, whether employees pursue risky ideas that have the potential of a
breakthrough (Hall, 2010). In brief, innovation has multiple dimensions and no single
measure can capture it in totality, at least not as yet (Zhang et al., 2012). Given such a
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setting, a meta-analysis of technological innovation can help to get an overall
understanding of its relationship to firm performance.

2.2.2

Technological Innovation and Firm Performance

The relationship between technological innovation and firm performance has been
extensively investigated across disciplines, but the overall results are mixed and
inconclusive (Han et al., 2013; Oke, 2007). Extant research has looked at various reasons
to explain the inconclusive nature of the technological innovation → performance
relationship. Examples of studies that demonstrate a negative relationship are Durand et al.
(2008) that found a firm’s financial performance (measured by return on sales) to be
negatively affected by patent activity of that firm in the biotechnology sector; and
Terwiesch and Loch (1998) that similarly concluded a negative to no impact of innovation
intensity on a firm’s profitability. The researchers on the dark side of this debate have
argued in favor of a negative relationship between technological innovation and firm
performance because of the associated sky-high investment costs, uncertainty of returns
from those investments as well as long delays associated with those returns
(Chandrasekaran and Tellis, 2008; Sood et al., 2009). Zhang et al. (2012) argues that the
market only rewards ‘commercially-successful’ innovations and not just efforts in
innovation like patenting. Then, an added challenge is accurately measuring firm’s
financial returns from innovation investments given the increasing speed of innovation
diffusion across global markets and the existence of diverse patterns of consumer adoption
across products and countries (Chandrasekaran and Tellis, 2008; Sood and Tellis, 2009).
Some scholars have attributed the contradictory nature of these findings to the lack
of an all-encompassing and generalizable measure of technological innovation. For
9

example, Heeley et al. (2007) studied the effect of R&D and patenting on firm’s financial
performance and found opposing results. They posit that R&D investment as an input to
the innovation process is a marker of the level of a firm’s innovation; while patenting
reflects a firm’s innovation output. They empirically showed that higher R&D intensity
lead to an increase in stock returns, but patent count had no effect on stock returns. Given
the drawbacks of the existing measures, Zhang et al. (2012) came up with a new measure
of innovation-innovation awards. They argue that winning an innovation award measures
the overall effectiveness of that innovation which goes beyond merely introducing an
innovative product/process, thereby providing a more accurate picture of its effect on firm
profitability. They do urge for more future research to better understand and resolve the
ongoing debate.
Furthermore, researchers have argued that a firm’s performance measures are
subject to various contextual factors, and empirically investigated how they can influence
the direction of the impact of innovation on firm performance. For example, Jansen et al.
(2006) found that exploratory innovation had a positive impact on a firm’s financial
performance, while exploitative innovation had a negative impact if the operating
environment was dynamic in nature. Thornhill (2006) concluded that innovation positively
impacts performance under the effect of industry dynamism.
The review of innovation literature shows that the majority of the empirical
research favors a positive relationship though. For example, the seminal meta-analysis
paper by Capon et al. (1990) empirically concluded that R&D-intensive firms achieve
higher financial performance. Chaney and Devinney (2006) similarly found positive
market returns from innovation announcements. A survey-based study by Oke (2007), also
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concluded innovation to be positively related to firm performance. An event study by
Zhang et al. (2012), that was based on a sample of 1141 firms, found innovation-award
winning firms to be financially more successful.
To conclude, extant literature has explored various pathways to explain the
conflicting nature of technological innovation → performance relationship, but given the
associated complexity and richness of this debate, a generalizable conclusion is yet to be
found.

A meta-analytic investigation will help to validate and generalize the focal

relationship over the varying empirical settings in different papers, something that can be
overwhelming or out-of-scope for a single traditional-style empirical study. Accurately
assessing the effects of technological innovation on firm-level outcomes may be critical to
empirically proving that markets respond favorably to technological innovation, which in
turn can motivate firms to invest in it. Given the above arguments, the first hypothesis to
test the overall focal relationship is stated as follows, while recognizing that no distinction
is made between the different stages of innovation process in this chapter (Wolfe 1994).

Hypothesis 1. Technological innovations of a firm are positively related to its performance.
2.2.3

Country-Level Moderating Effects

The country-level moderating effects relate to the influence of institutional environment
and the influence of culture. The latter has multiple dimensions, two of which are
specifically addressed in this study.

2.2.3.1 Influence of Institutional Environment
The institution-based view (IBV) says that a firm’s strategies, practices, and outcomes are
all influenced by the institutional environment of the nation in which the firm is based
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(Scott, 2013). The term ‘institutional environment’ of a nation represents the rules and
regulations created by different institutional forces like political, legal, economic, and
social systems. Ignoring the institutional environment prevents us from getting a deeper
understanding of the drivers of firm performance in both developed (Oliver and Holzinger,
2008) as well as developing countries (Lau and Bruton, 2008). Heugens et al. (2009) in
their meta-analytic study covering 11 Asian countries and 65 research papers, concluded a
significant role of jurisdictional institutional factors on firm performance. IBV has reemerged as a leading strategic perspective in recent research in explaining firm-level
heterogeneity (Li et al., 2010; Mike et al., 2009; Van Essen et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2016).
A study by Li et al. (2010) examined the role of offshore OEM cooperation on local
Chinese suppliers under the influence of ill-developed formal institutions that are found in
China. Another recent study by Wang et al. (2016) examined the role of institutional
environment on buyer-supplier relationships in emerging markets.
In this chapter, it is posited that part of the heterogeneity in the strength of the focal
relationship can be explained by the institutional environment of the nation in which the
firm operates. In the case of innovation, UNESCO’s Institute of Statistics (UIS) in their
(2009) report notes a weak institutional environment characterized by weakness of property
rights and market regulation among others as an impediment to innovation. While the
institutional environment has many dimensions, the focus here is specifically on the level
of financial development and the level of intellectual-property protection of a nation.
Firms in general, and more specifically those that indulge in their own innovation
activities, require funding. It has been empirically shown that firms perform better in
nations that are more financially developed. One of the markers of financial development
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of a nation is capital market regulation. Firms use the capital market to raise those muchneeded long-term funds. Availability of such long-term funds can feed a firm’s research
and development and/or patenting costs, in short, innovation activities. An innovationrelated project is typically performed in multiple stages over a considerable amount of time.
A firm’s credit-worthiness is re-visited by the lending parties throughout the different
stages of the project. The government monitors and regulates the capital market to ensure
its efficient functioning. The primary purpose of these regulations is to protect investors
from fraudulent transactions. Various studies have examined how these capital market
regulations impact economic activity in a nation (Barbosa and Faria, 2011; Cressy, 1996).
Well-established capital markets (characterized by the availability of financial credit) have
been shown to positively impact a firm’s innovation (Barbosa and Faria, 2011; Bottazzi
and Da Rin, 2002). In line with Barbosa and Faria (2011), the availability of credit
information (CII) is used as the proxy for capital market regulation. To conclude, wellregulated capital markets would allow a reliable and timely access to credit. One way to
maintain/improve the access to credit is by increasing the accessibility and quality of
information about a firm’s credit-worthiness. Hence, it can be reasonably expected that the
availability of credit information will moderate the focal relationship, which leads to the
second hypothesis H2.

Hypothesis 2. The stronger the capital market regulation in a nation, the stronger the
relationship between technological innovation and firm performance.
In addition to better access to finance, possessing rights of ownership (e.g. in the
form of patents and trademarks) on the product/s of their innovative activities (referred to
as the intellectual property) also enables firms to monopolize the returns on innovation
13

(Ginarte and Park, 1997). The primary motivation for a firm behind investing in innovation
is to augment profits and stay ahead of its competitors. The financial returns from an
innovative product are deeply impacted by the ability of the firm to monopolize the sales
of that product in the target market, as well as prevent any imitation of that product by its
competitors (Jaffe, 1986; Nelson and Winter, 1982). Given the current level of
globalization, innovating firms need to protect their inventions from both domestic as well
as global competition (Chen and Puttitanun, 2005). The national governments have thus
created a legal framework to provide protection to intellectual property of innovating firms
with the objective of (a) incentivizing domestic firms to continue to innovate, and (b) attract
multinational firms into investing in their country (Varsakelis, 2001). In order to draw
comparison across nations in terms of the strength of patent protection offered, the patent
protection index (PPI) created by Ginarte and Park (1997) is utilized. This index measures
the level of patent protection in a nation across five dimensions: (1) extent of coverage of
inventions that are considered patentable, (2) membership in international patent treaties,
(3) duration of protection, (4) enforcement mechanisms, and (5) restrictions on patent
rights (Park, 2008). To conclude, since the legal ownership of its intellectual property via
patents enables the innovating firm to prevent imitation of their innovations, monopolize
the market, and maintain their competitive edge, it is hypothesized that firms operating in
nations with a stronger framework of patent protection would experience better
performance-related outcomes from innovation.

Hypothesis 3. The stronger the patent protection in a nation, the stronger the relationship
between technological innovation and firm performance.
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2.2.3.2 Influence of Culture
The influence of national culture on firm performance is well-established in both OM as
well as other disciplines (Kirkman et al., 2006; Power et al., 2010). Cultural values and
practices are engrained (in other words, institutionalized) within citizens of a nation. The
management practices of a firm reflect the cultural mindsets of the country in which the
firm is based. Majority of the work done on cross-cultural comparisons has adopted the
framework of national culture created by Hofstede (Flynn and Saladin, 2006; Power et al.,
2010). He identified six major dimensions of culture, namely power distance, uncertainty
avoidance, individualism vs. collectivism, masculinity vs. femininity, long-term vs. shortterm orientation, and indulgence vs. restraint (Hofstede et al., 2010). He proposed that
national culture defines and influences how a firm’s management and employees adapt to
new practices and ideas, how they solve problems, how they make decision in uncertain
business situations, whether they value team-work over individual accomplishment and
more; and in turn effects firm outcomes. Innovation-related initiatives made by a firm are
not foreign to this influence either. Becheikh et al. (2006) provide a comprehensive review
of innovation-related empirical studies in the manufacturing sector from 1993-2003. They
found that the overall results on the effects of culture on innovation-related firm outcomes
are quite varied with some significant and some insignificant results. Hence, cross-cultural
differences do play a role in whether firms succeed from the introduction of innovations.
Two of the six cultural dimensions proposed by Hofstede fit well in the context of
innovation based on the inherent nature of innovation and the inclination of the extant
empirical research. First, the dimension of Individualism vs. Collectivism (IDV) has been
the most widely utilized in firm-level research (Kirkman et al., 2006). The IDV dimension
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captures the degree of individualism of a country’s citizens, in other words, the degree to
which people put their own interests over that of the community. Highly individualistic
cultures, like the US, value individual merit and accomplishments. Individuals from these
cultures tend to perform better in projects that ensure individual accountability and
recognition compared to projects that require teamwork. People from collectivistic
cultures, on the other hand, place more emphasis on relationship building (personal or firmlevel or team-level) over a single individual’s interests and achievements. Higher the value
on this dimension, more individualistic is the nation’s culture. Power and his colleagues
(2010) assessed the influence of ‘individualism vs. collectivism’ on innovation-related
investment outcomes in Western and Asian economies, and concluded that innovationrelated investments led to better performance (cost, quality, delivery, and flexibility) in
collectivistic (Asian) economies compared to that in individualistic (Western) economies.
Another study by Rosenbusch et al. (2011), that focused on small and medium-sized
manufacturing firms (SMEs), also concluded that firms based in collectivistic cultures
benefitted more from innovation because work on innovation projects was done
collaboratively between employees as well as with customers and suppliers. Moreover,
they argue that firms in collectivistic cultures tend to imitate more than innovate. As fewer
firms strive for innovation in collectivistic cultures, those few firms that do indulge in true
innovative behavior can benefit more from their efforts than firms based in cultures where
innovation is pursued by the bulk of them.
Innovation requires collective brainstorming of ideas and teamwork in facing the
associated challenges. A collectivistic culture promotes communication and cooperation
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among team members. Building on the previous research, it is hypothesized in H4 that the
focal relationship is stronger in more collectivistic cultures.

Hypothesis 4. The lower the degree of individualism in a nation, the stronger the
relationship between technological innovation and firm performance.
Additionally, the Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI) dimension captures the overall
degree of averseness of a country’s citizens to uncertainty and ambiguity. The extent to
which the citizens avoid unknown future situations can negatively influence the
performance outcomes of innovation. Conversely, the extent of acceptance of
new/different ideas, and innovative products/processes, can positively influence
performance outcomes of technological innovation. Higher the value on this dimension,
lower is the degree of discomfort of the nation’s culture with uncertainty. Becheikh et al.
(2006) found that cultures ranking low in UAI were overall more innovative. Given that
innovation is the implementation of new and challenging ideas with uncertain outcomes, it
is posited that firms would perform better if they are based in cultures that do not shy away
from delving in innovative projects that don’t have predictable outcomes. This leads to the
final hypothesis H5.

Hypothesis 5. The lower the degree of uncertainty avoidance in a nation, the stronger the
relationship between technological innovation and firm performance.
Figure 2.1 presents the proposed model, and its hypothesized relationships.

2.3

Data and Methodology

The methodology of Meta-Analysis (MA) is one of the many ways to summarize, interpret,
and compare different empirical studies that examine the same construct(s) and
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relationship(s) (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001). MA can greatly aid in bringing one closer to the
‘true’ relationship between constructs of interest compared to a single primary study. and
in turn promote theory building (Hunter and Schmidt, 2004; Lipsey and Wilson, 2001). It
becomes a fitting technique for our research because our purpose is to integrate the mixed
findings on technological innovation→ performance link while also testing for countrylevel moderating effects.

Figure 2.1. Proposed Technological Innovation and Firm Performance Model
Two different sets of meta-analytic techniques were utilized for the analysis. To
test the first hypothesis H1, the Hedges and Olkin-type meta-analysis technique
(commonly referred to as HOMA) (Hedges et al., 1985) was applied. HOMA computes the
meta-analytic mean effect-size for the focal relationship, its standard deviation, and the
corresponding confidence interval. The HOMA technique allows the use of both the fixedeffects model and the random-effects model. Since, the effect-size distribution for the focal
relationship is assumed to be heterogeneous, the random-effects model was chosen instead
of the fixed-effects model. The random-effects HOMA model corrects for both sampling
error and other variability sources (denoted by a value) (Hedges et al., 1985). Also, the
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random-effects model is (a) more conservative than fixed-effects model, and (b) favored
over a fixed-effects model in current MA practices (Heugens et al., 2009; Raudenbush et
al., 2002; Van Essen et al., 2012). If the effect-size distributions are homogenous, both
models produce comparable results.
To test for hypotheses H2-H5, Meta-Analytic Regression Analysis, (referred to as
MARA) (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001) was applied. MARA uses a weighted least-squares
(WLS) regression model in which the dependent variable is the observed effect size for the
focal relationship. MARA helps to fill in the gap on the causes of heterogeneity in the
effect-size distribution by testing for two types of moderating effects: (a) methodological
artifacts that cause the observed effect size to differ from the actual effect size, and/or (b)
new/external moderating variables that were not part of any of the studies comprising the
study sample. Both the methodological artifacts and external moderators (CII, PPI, IDV
and UAI) were included to conduct MARA.
Like HOMA, one can choose between a fixed-effects model and a mixed-effects
model to run MARA. A fixed-effects model assumes that all between-study differences
can wholly be attributed to systematic variance (captured by the newly-included
moderators) and subject-level sampling error. A mixed-effects model assumes the same,
but also considers a third random component that is either unmeasured or even
immeasurable. A mixed-effects model has a lower Type-1 error rate, and offers more
conservative results (Geyskens et al., 2009). Again, the mixed-effects model was used for
the same reasons as those stated for HOMA.
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To conduct the entire meta-analysis, starting from study selection to analyzing
coded data, the instructions laid out by Lipsey and Wilson in their book (Lipsey and
Wilson, 2001) were followed, and referred to as the LW procedure for the rest of the paper.

2.3.1

Study Selection

To assess the research model, a sample frame was established by collecting empirical
studies that theorize and measure the focal relationship. This effort included carefully
examining Google scholar, web of science, EBSCO, and JSTOR databases, and filtering
studies using search terms including but not limited to “performance”, “innovation”, “R&D
expenditure”, “patent”, “new product introduction”, “technological innovation”, “product
innovation”, “process innovation”, “innovation award”, “innovation survey.” Thirteen
journals were screened for relevant papers. In addition to Management Science (MS),
Academy of Management Journal (AMJ), Strategic Management Journal (SMJ), Research
Policy (RP), and Journal of Product Innovation Management (JPIM) that comprise the top
five most-cited journals to publish innovation-related research (Crossan, 2010), this journal
list included Journal of Operations Management (JOM), Productions and Operations
Management (POM), Decision Sciences (DS), International Journal of Operations and
Production Management (IJOPM), International Journal of Production Economics (IJPE),
Journal of Business Venturing (JBV), International Journal of Business (IJB), and Journal
of Management Studies (JMS). In addition, Zhang et al. (2012) provide an excellent review
of innovation literature, and we were able to add two more papers to the sample from those
reviewed in their study.
Once the first set of research studies was accumulated, each paper was manually
studied in detail to ensure that only papers that analyzed the focal relationship were
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included. Papers that were empirical in nature, and which provided all the information
needed to conduct meta-analysis, were shortlisted. Accordingly, conceptual papers,
qualitative papers, case studies and analytical-modeling papers were not considered. The
reference lists of papers were also screened to look for any other potentially relevant papers
that had not come up in the web search. This process resulted in a final sample of 28 studies.
This sample size is consistent with other published meta-analysis studies in operations
management and other fields (Gerwin and Barrowman, 2002; Mackelprang and Nair, 2010;
Nair, 2006). Appendix A.1 provides a summary of the list of studies.

2.3.2

Coding Procedure

Sufficient time and care was taken in evaluating each study. Both focal variables i.e.
technological innovation, and firm performance, have been conceptualized and
operationalized differently across research disciplines. Measures of performance gathered
from the collected sample comprised of both objective measures (for e.g., market measures
like Tobin’s Q and market share; and accounting measures like ROA and ROS), and
subjective measures (gathered from single-item or multi-item Likert-based survey data).
Similarly, measures of technological innovation also comprised of both objective measures
(secondary sources and/or economic data) and subjective measures (single-item or multiitem Likert-based). All the different measures of performance and technological innovation
were included regardless of their type. This is in line with the current conventional practices
in meta-analytic studies (Carney et al., 2011; Gerwin and Barrowman, 2002; Hülsheger et
al., 2009; Van Essen et al., 2012). The type of operationalization of all variables
(performance, innovation, and control variables, if any) examined in each of the 28 studies
was coded, along with any transformation applied on those variables. Apart from the type
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of operationalization used, collected studies also differed in other characteristics. For
example, majority of the studies have examined the focal relationship in the manufacturing
sector and collected cross-sectional data. Only two studies in the sample inspected panel
data. The descriptive statistics of the final sample are shown in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1. Descriptive Statistics of the Study Sample (N = 28)
Methodological Characteristics

Number of Studies

Data from Manufacturing Sector

14

Data from Service Sector

4

Data from Both Sectors

10

Cross-Sectional Design

26

Panel Design

2

Controlled for Firm Size

18

Controlled for Industry Effects

11

Technological Innovation Operationalization

Number of Studies a

Subjective Measures

16

Objective Measures

17

Note.

a

Some researchers have used more than one type of measure in their study. Hence, the total
number of studies adds up to a number greater than the study sample of 28 papers.

To test for H1, effect sizes between all variables (dependent, independent and
control variables, if any); their significance test values (these can be t-statistics, z-value,
and/or p-value); and sample sizes from each of the 28 studies were coded. The LW
procedure uses a statistically standardized ‘effect size’. In other words, the effect-size
statistic standardizes findings across studies such that they can be directly compared
(Lipsey and Wilson, 2001). If a study contained multiple measurements of the focal
relationship, for e.g. Heeley et al. (2007), all measurements from that study were included
because it ensures higher estimation accuracy (Bijmolt and Pieters, 2001). Correlation was
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used as the effect-size statistic (Carney et al., 2011; Heugens et al., 2009; Van Essen et al.,
2012). Since meta-analysis focuses on both the direction and magnitude of the effects
across studies, and not on statistical significance, both significant and insignificant effect
sizes from each paper in the study sample were included to reduce bias in outcomes (Lipsey
and Wilson, 2001). This approach is also consistent with previous meta-analytic studies
(Carney et al., 2011; Gerwin and Barrowman, 2002; Heugens and Lander, 2009;
Mackelprang and Nair, 2010). The words ‘effect size’ and ‘correlation’ are used
interchangeably hereafter.
Both bivariate (Pearson Product-Moment) correlations and partial correlations were
included as effect sizes (Geyskens et al., 2009; Lipsey and Wilson, 2001; Van Essen et al.,
2012). It must be noted that partial correlation is an unbiased, scale-free, linear estimate of
association that also renders the capability to detect model misspecification and is the more
commonly used effect size. Using partial correlations makes it possible to include studies
with missing effect-size data since it can be directly computed from the regression output.
Not all studies embodied both types of correlations in the study sample. Therefore, to
ensure that each study was represented in the analysis, the data from both types of
correlations was aggregated (Mor Barak et al., 2009). In total, 132 effect sizes were
obtained from the 28 studies in the sample, out of which 87 were partial correlations, and
45 were bivariate correlations.
To control for skewness in the effect-size distribution, all effect sizes were
transformed to a Fisher Z-transform (Hedges et al., 1985) before being used in the analysis.
This transformation ensured that all effect-size values were now relatively closer to a
normal distribution. Additionally, the effect sizes are weighted using an inverse variance
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weight, denoted by w (Hedges et al., 1985). The sample size (N) of each study was used to
weight the effect size obtained from that study, so that studies using a larger dataset carry
more weight than those using a smaller dataset.
To test H2-H5, four new moderating variables were proposed in this study, and the
data for them was extracted from independent sources. The first moderator called ‘Credit
Information Index (CII)’ is used as a proxy for capital-market regulation to test H2. The
second moderator called ‘Patent Protection Index (PPI)’ is used as a proxy for strength of
patent protection in a nation and is used to test H3. The third moderator variable, called
‘Individualism vs. Collectivism (IDV)’ measures the degree of individualism in a nation
and is used to test H4. The fourth moderator variable, called ‘Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI)’
measures the degree of discomfort with uncertain situations of a national culture and is
used to test H5. To control for multi-collinearity, all four moderators were orthogonalized
before conducting MARA.
Next, it also needs to be determined if the heterogeneity in the effect-size
distribution is influenced by the design and methodology employed by the studies (Lipsey
and Wilson, 2001). Based on the varying methodological characteristics of the 28 studies,
five methodological moderating variables were created. Two dummy variables were
created to capture if study used only manufacturing-industry data or only service-industry
data, or data from both industries (10=manufacturing industry data, 01=service industry
data). The following characteristics were also included as dummy variables: (1) use of
cross-sectional data or panel data, (2) controlled for firm size or not, and (3) controlled for
industry effects or not. Table 2.2 provides a description of all the moderating variables that
were included in the analysis.

24

Table 2.2. Description of the Moderating Variables
Moderators

Description

Credit
Information
Index (CII)

CII measures rules affecting the scope, accessibility, and quality of
credit information available through either public or private credit
registries. The index ranges from 0 to 6, with higher values
indicating the availability of more credit information. CII scores
were obtained from World Bank’s Doing Business databasehttp://www.doingbusiness.org.

Patent Protection
Index (PPI)

PPI measures the strength of patent protection in a nation. It is an
unweighted sum of scores along five dimensions: (1) extent of
coverage of inventions that are considered patentable, (2)
membership in international patent treaties, (3) duration of
protection, (4) enforcement mechanisms, and (5) restrictions on
patent rights. The index ranges from 0 to 5, with higher values
indicating stronger protection. PPI scores were obtained from
Ginarte and Park (1997) and Park (2008).

Individualism
(IDV)

IDV measures the degree of individualism of a nation. IDV
dimension scores were obtained from http://geert-hofstede.com/

Uncertainty
Avoidance (UAI)

UAI measures the degree of discomfort with uncertainty and
ambiguity. UAI dimension scores were obtained from http://geerthofstede.com/

Methodological
Variables

Description

Manufacturing
Industry Data

Dummy variable coded as 1 if study examined only manufacturing
industries.

Service Industry
Data

Dummy variable coded as 1 if study examined only service
industries.

Study Design

Dummy variable coded as 1 if study used cross-sectional design.

Firm Size

Dummy variable coded as 1 if study controlled for firm size.

Industry Effects

Dummy variable coded as 1 if study controlled for industry effects.

2.4

Analysis and Results

The STATA macros provided by Lipsey and Wilson were used for the analysis (Wilson,
2001). In section 2.4.1, the big picture of how firm performance is affected by
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technological innovation (H1 results) is evaluated, followed by a discussion of the
moderation effects on the focal relationship (H2-H5 results).

2.4.1

Results for Hypothesis 1

HOMA is run to test H1, and the corresponding results shown in Table 2.3 indicate a
positive and significant relationship between technological innovation and firm
performance. So H1 is supported. The mean of the relationship is 0.1 and is statistically
significant with a p-value < 0.001, also the 95% confidence interval does not include zero.
The effect size is in the small-to-medium range (Cohen, 1992), thus implying that
technological innovation tends to positively but moderately influence firm performance.
These findings need to be investigated further to evaluate if the strength of the focal link is
heterogenous. To do so, the Cochran’s (1954) Q test of homogeneity was performed, along
with calculating the I2 index. The Q-test value is 2985.1 and is statistically significant with
a p-value <0.001. The I2 index measures the degree of homogeneity, and a value > 0.75
indicates a high level of heterogeneity. The value of I2 implies that the effect-size
distribution is substantially heterogeneous. Therefore, it is worthwhile to examine next how
much of this observed heterogeneity is accounted for by the moderators.
Table 2.3. Results of HOMA (Hypothesis 1)
Focal Relationship
Technological Innovation
to Firm Performance
Note.

N

k

Mean ρ

S.E.

Q test

102,519 132 0.099**** 0.016 2985.1***

I2
95%

N= total sample size; k= no. of effect sizes; mean ρ=estimate of population correlation; S.E.=
standard error of mean ρ; Q= Cochran’s homogeneity test statistic; I2= scale-free index of
heterogeneity; * p-value<0.1, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value<0.01, **** p-value<0.001
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2.4.2

Results for Hypotheses 2-5

MARA was run to test H2-H5 with two different regression models as shown in Table 2.4.
Model 1 includes only the methodological variables. Model 2 represents the full model that
includes both sets of variables described in Table 2.2. Three statistics indicate the model
fit: (1) the R2 value, (2) the Qmodel value, which represents the variance explained by the
regression model, and (3) the Qresidual value, which represents the variance left unexplained
by the model.
Table 2.4. Results of MARA (Hypothesis 2-5)
Variables
Constant
Methodological Variables
Manufacturing Industry Data
Service Industry Data
Study Design
Firm Size
Industry Effects

Model 1
Coefficient a
S.E.
.037
0.089

Model 2
Coefficient a S.E.
0.161
0.099

0.036
0.126**
0.07
-0.027
-0.023

0.036
0.036
-0.058
-0.011
-0.024

0.041
0.065
0.085
0.040
0.039

-0.006
-0.039*
-0.064****
-0.033*

0.017
0.020
0.019
0.017

Moderators
Credit Information Index (CII)
Patent Protection Index (PPI)
Individualism (IDV)
Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI)
R2
k
Qmodel
Qresidual
Note.

0.05
132
10.75**
193.66****

0.037
0.058
0.078
0.039
0.034

0.14
132
29.32****
174.31***

a

Unstandardized regression coefficients; k= no. of effect sizes; Q= Cochran’s homogeneity test
statistic; * p-value<0.1, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value<0.01, **** p-value<0.001

As per Table 2.4, the R2 value increased from Model 1 (0.05) to Model 2 (0.14).
Both models fit the data reasonably well, and the fit improves when moving from one
model to the next. The Qmodel value increased from Model 1 (Q=10.75; p-value<0.05) to
Model 2 (Q=29.32; p-value<0.001). This implies that the full model (Model 2) captures
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the heterogeneity well. The Qresidual value decreased from Model 1 (Q=193.66; pvalue<0.001) to Model 2 (Q=174.31; p-value<0.01) but remains significant. This implies
that even though Model 2 fits reasonably well, the included moderators do not ‘fully’
capture the heterogeneity in the effect-size distribution. Hence, additional moderators need
to be tested to account for the leftover heterogeneity.
Further examination of the MARA results in Table 2.4 reveals that only three out
of four moderators: PPI, IDV, and UAI are statistically significant. First, in looking into
the moderating role of a capital market regulatory-type institutional context, results show
that CII does not drive the focal relationship (p>0.1). Furthermore, CII has a negative
moderating effect, contrary to what was hypothesized. Hence, H2 is not supported. This
was a surprising result. Numerous studies have shown a correlation between financial
development (characterized by well-developed capital market) of a nation and firm
performance for the simple reason that firms need ‘access to finance’ (Claessens and
Tzioumis, 2006). This correlation is even more pertinent to innovative firms since
innovation necessitates high investment costs. A possible explanation for the counterintuitive result is that, availability of credit information is not the only factor behind
ensuring that firms in fact do get timely access to finance. So even in the presence of
transparency and availability of information about borrower firms (as reflected by a high
value of CII), a lender might still deny the loan for the following reasons. First, studies
have shown that innovation-related investments are treated differently than regular
investments because of the associated risks and unpredictable returns (Hall, 2010).
Furthermore, most of the innovation investment is spent on intellectual capital (which is
considered tacit) and intangible assets. This exacerbates the perceived riskiness and
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uncertainty of returns from the innovation-related investment (Hall, 2010). Recent
literature has shown that access to credit is different for innovative firms vs. that of noninnovative firms (Bellucci et al., 2014; Hall, 2010). This is further complicated by whether
the firm is a start-up or an incumbent (Bellucci et al., 2014; Hain and Christensen, 2013).
Another possible explanation as to why the results here do not reconcile with extant
research is omitted-variable bias. It is possible that the results reflect the omission of firmlevel characteristics from the model like firm growth over time and/or firm assets, both of
which can influence a lender’s decision in giving out credit. In brief, the intrinsic nature of
innovation coupled with past firm innovation-related outcomes might take precedence over
the availability of credit information when it comes to lending decisions. And the direction
of the relationship is potentially being influenced by these omitted variables.
Second, results indicate that the strength of patent protection (PPI) does
significantly moderate (p-value=0.054) the focal relationship however not as hypothesized.
Hence, H3 is only partially supported. This result runs contrary to the basic assumption
that incentives drive firm actions as well as what numerous previous studies have shown,
that PPI has a positive impact on innovation (Chen and Puttitanun, 2005; Lerner, 2009;
Varsakelis, 2001). A possible explanation for this is that even though patenting provides a
firm ownership over its inventions, it also publicizes a firm’s internal intellectual capital.
A study by Cohen et. al (2000) discussed how competitors can work around the patent until
its expiry, after which they can go ahead and use the patent. This behavior discourages the
innovating firm to patent their inventions. Second, Pisano (2006) has argued that the impact
of patent protection on the ‘rate and direction’ of innovation and its outcomes is more
complicated than what has been hypothesized thus far. Additionally, the choice to patent
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is dependent on the ‘appropriability regime’ in which the firm operates. The
appropriability regime in a nation is a combination of the strength of patent protection as
well as the ease of imitability. Firms may not choose to patent their inventions it they don’t
deem imitation to be a concern. Also, given that the primary motivation of a firm is to
maximize its financial returns from an innovative product, firms today are following an
alternate strategy of intentionally sharing their proprietary knowledge as long as the
receiver does not appropriate it. Additionally, Lerner (2009), also found strengthening of
the patent protection framework to negatively impact innovation. Hence, in the current age
of technological advancements, the legal framework of patent protection is perhaps
becoming more of a deterrent when firms are moving away from patenting their inventions.
In terms of the moderating role of national culture, both IDV and UAI negatively
moderate the influence of technological innovation on firm performance. Hence, both H4
and H5 are fully supported. Result for H4 implies that firms based in highly individualistic
cultures (or higher value of IDV) tend to experience lower performance outcomes from
technological innovation. This result indicates that fostering collaboration and
communication among employee groups as well as giving precedence to the team-level
success instead of to individual freedom and accomplishment can promote better
innovation-related outcomes. Similarly, firms based in nations having a higher value of
UAI also tend to experience lower performance outcomes with technological innovations.
In other words, firms whose employees do not pull back from uncertain and ambiguous
circumstances can gain better innovation-related outcomes.
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2.4.3

Results for Methodological Variables

Results for the effect of methodological variables on the focal relationship is presented in
Table 2.4. Overall, none of the methodological variables were significant. In Model 1, only
‘Service Industry Data’ was positive and statistically significant with a p-value <0.05.
However, it turned insignificant after inclusion of the four main moderating variables.
Finally, the temporal design of the study, controlling for firm size, and controlling for
industry-level effects, also did not impact the focal relationship.

2.4.4

Robustness Test

The objective measures of technological innovation were separated from the subjective
measures, and HOMA was run separately for both categories. This was done to assess if
the overall results were independent of the way technological innovation was
operationalized. Table 2.5 shows the breakdown of these results, which indicate that even
though the direction of the focal relationship remains unaffected by the type of measure
used for technological innovation, the strength of the focal relationship does get affected.
Table 2.5. Robustness Test
Technological Innovation
Operationalization

N

k

Mean ρ

S.E.

Q test

I2

Subjective Measures

16,508 46

0.195**** 0.008 628.77***

Objective Measures

86,011 86

0.056**** 0.018 2337.85*** 96%

Note.

93%

N= total sample size; k= no. of effect sizes; mean ρ=estimate of population correlation; S.E.=
standard error of mean ρ; Q= Cochran’s homogeneity test statistic; I2= scale-free index of
heterogeneity; * p-value<0.1, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value<0.01, **** p-value<0.001

The focal relationship is positive and statistically significant (p-value <0.001) for
both types of innovation measures. However, the mean for the subjective-measure category
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is 0.195, while for the objective-measure category is 0.056. This implies that one would
observe a relatively stronger influence of technological innovation on firm performance
when subjective measures were employed, relative to when objective measures were
employed. Summarizing, even though a modestly positive relationship is indicated
between the focal variables, its magnitude clearly varies and is driven by the type of
measure (subjective vs. objective) used for technological innovation.

2.5

Discussion

Zhang et al. in their 2012 study noted that the link between innovation and performance
outcomes was “weak and inconsistent”. They attributed the inconclusive nature of this
relationship to (a) inadequacy of the existing innovation measures, and (b) lack of
knowledge and understanding of the factors on which the innovation-performance link
might be contingent. Use of meta-analysis as a research methodology afforded high
statistical power in quantitatively compiling these mixed research findings. First, the
relationship between technological innovation and firm performance is statistically
significant and modestly positive. Second, these results further indicate that the sources of
variability in the strength of the focal relationship stem not only from the different ways of
measuring technological innovation, but also from the contextual factors at play.
Four new moderating variables (CII, PPI, IDV, and UAI) were introduced to
account for the said variability. Evidence was found that the focal relationship is
conditional on the institutional effect of the strength of patent protection in a nation
(represented by PPI). The direction of the result was however, contrary to what was
hypothesized. Increasing the strength of patent protection tends to dampen the performance
outcomes of technological innovation. This counter-intuitive result indicates that strong
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patent protection frameworks might in fact prove to be a deterrent to the firm in maximizing
its profits especially in situations where the innovative product is either not vulnerable to
imitation and/or intentional sharing of intellectual property holds the potential to enhance
financial returns.
Both IDV and UAI significantly influence the focal relationship when examining
the impact of cross-cultural differences on the performance sensitivity to technological
innovation. The ideal cultural environment for the focal relationship is low levels of
individualism and low levels of uncertainty avoidance. Consider the example of United
States (US) that ranks low on UAI dimension and is number one in the Global
Entrepreneurship Rankings Index (2017). US is also a highly individualistic nation.
Individual freedom, creativity and merit is given considerable importance. This is reflected
in the work-culture of firms. For example, employees prefer to work from home instead of
going to the office every day. They can communicate with other employees via
email/mobile if required. This affords them flexible schedules which is argued to be
necessary for coming up with new innovative ideas. However, many firms are starting to
realize what our results also indicate: a “tight correlation between personal interactions,
performance and innovation” and are implementing changes accordingly (Waber et al.,
2014). For example, Yahoo revoked mobile work privileges and Facebook got rid of
individual cubicles in their office building (Miller and Rampell, 2013). Overall, the
interaction of the institution-based view and the culture-based view helps us to get a deeper
understanding of the technological innovation-performance relationship.
This research also makes some methodological contributions. It introduces the
meta-analytic methodology of Lipsey and Wilson (LW) to the operations management
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(OM) discipline. To the best of our knowledge, the Hunter and Schmidt (2004) approach
of artifact-corrected meta-analysis has been the conventional standard thus far. OM
researchers are increasingly utilizing secondary data over survey data. The introduction of
the LW approach is timely because it facilitates a more quantitative aggregation of
empirical research findings across such studies that do not need correction for measurement
error. It has already become the popular choice in other disciplines (management, finance,
economics, and international business) (Carney et al., 2011; Van Essen et al., 2012). The
LW approach allows one to find relationships across different types of effect sizes. Both
partial correlations as well as bivariate correlations were used. Using partial correlations
made it possible to include studies with missing effect-size data since it can be directly
computed from the regression result. Using the LW procedure allowed us to test for
potential moderators.

2.6

Conclusion

To conclude, the research in this chapter has attempted to shed more light on the issues
recently raised in the OM literature by empirically resolving some of the inconsistency in
the focal relationship and attributing it to institutional and cultural factors at play.
Nevertheless, it suffers from several limitations. Primarily, the three moderators included
in the analysis did not sufficiently account for the heterogeneity in the effect-size
distribution of the focal relationship. There is still considerable variability that is
unaccounted for. Future research can benefit from further exploration of the underlying
mechanisms to account for some of that variability. Specifically, in terms of the
institutional context of credit availability, contradictory results were found. Further
research is needed to get a more nuanced view of what other variables might in fact be
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influencing the relationship between credit availability and innovation-related firm
performance.
In terms of methodological limitations, the study sample is not exhaustive because
it includes only 28 studies. Also, all included studies were published in the public domain.
Future research can extend the study sample to include more international journals; as well
as different types of research studies like working/unpublished work (thesis, articles), and
books (if available) etc. First, this would decrease confirmatory-bias and selection bias
(Pfeffer, 2007). It should be noted that meta-analytic studies do suffer from selection bias
because outcomes with negative or null findings mostly go unreported and hence are
difficult to find (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001). Second, given that enough studies are available,
the technological-innovation construct can be further segregated into product and process
innovation, and a meta-analysis can be done on each separately. Current research has
focused on elucidating the effects of innovation on firm performance as being quadratic in
nature (Story et al., 2015). Therefore, another interesting direction for future research
would be to model the focal relationship as quadratic instead of linear. Future meta-analysis
researchers are also encouraged to employ the LW procedure when their study sample
includes studies that examine secondary data, as well as to use partial correlations as a
complement to bivariate correlations.
Furthermore, outside the framework of meta-analysis, the literature review done in
this chapter strongly suggests that most of the innovation research has assumed firms to be
homogenous in nature. It would be interesting to investigate if firms in fact vary in how
much they can benefit from innovation, and if they do, which factors can potential account
for that variability. One recommendation for an influencing factor to the said relationship
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is the innovation being done by competitors. A firm can imitate the innovations being
carried out by its competitors by using the innovation knowledge that leaks out of those
firm/s. Existing research has established both innovation as well as imitation as strategies
adopted by firms to transform their financial performance (Jaffe, 1986). This innovation
knowledge that leaks out from one firm and is exploited by another is referred to as
Spillovers (Adams and Jaffe, 1996). Spillovers, in terms of R&D knowledge, have been
shown to increase the financial performance of imitating firms but decrease the financial
performance of innovative firm (Cohen et al., 2000). Future OM research can benefit from
extending this area of research to an operations context. Hence, the next chapter of this
dissertation (a) narrows down on the technological-innovation typology to target
operational innovation specifically, (b) investigates if spillovers in terms of operational
knowledge exist, and if they do, (c) examines the moderating role of operationalknowledge spillovers on the performance outcomes of firms from operational capabilities
in the form of inventory, sourcing lead time, and flexibility.
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CHAPTER 3
Assessing the Implications of Inventory, Sourcing Lead Time, and
Volume Flexibility Spillovers on the Financial Performance of
Manufacturing Firms
3.1. Introduction
Responding to ever-growing competition, manufacturing firms continually seek ideas to
improve their operational performance (Hammer, 2005). Such innovative ideas however,
need not be developed in-house, but rather could be learned from another firm. For
example, the highly successful Kanban system which was pioneered by Japanese
manufacturing firms was subsequently adopted widely by American manufacturing firms.
Research on benchmarking (Sarkis, 2000; Shah and Ward, 2003) suggests that
firms can compare their own operational competencies to industry standards or other highperforming firms, and set targets to improve themselves by imitating and/or emulating
these firms. Walmart in an attempt to boost its online retailing operations, and “catch-up”
to Amazon.com, its immediate competitor, recently made some changes to its operational
policies (Yohn, 2017). It introduced free two-day shipping on online purchases and offered
discounts to customers willing to pick-up their online orders from a Wal-Mart store.
However, despite imitating a similar shipping policy as Amazon.com, Walmart has yet to
realize the desired benefits. In its desire to “catch-up” to Amazon.com, Walmart has not
fully exploited its internal operational capability (that it gained after acquiring Jet.com, the
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other e-commerce giant) of holding less inventory, which would then allow it to offer items
at significantly lower prices. Does this mean that imitation as a strategy is necessarily a
wrong move for all firms? Of course not. What works for one company might or might not
work for another (potentially reflected by varying operational performance between firms),
which raises the question about what factors must a firm consider before making the choice
of imitating rival firms.
The innovating firm, on the other hand, may try to prevent imitation of their
innovations to monopolize the market and maintain their competitive edge. For example,
one way of discouraging imitation is for firms to not patent their most priced innovations.
This strategy may sound counterintuitive, since patenting affords the firms legal right of
ownership. However, it also turns the in-house idea into public knowledge, and competitors
can work around the patent until the time limit expires, after which they can move ahead
and use the patented idea (Cohen et al., 2000). Apple’s lawsuit against Samsung for patent
infringement (Mullin, 2016) is a classic example of an industry giant being protective about
its innovations to maintain its position in the industry. Nevertheless, 100% protection is
impossible due to a variety of reasons (Harhoff, 1996; Knott, 2008), and other firms do
eventually gather the by-products that leak outside the innovating firm. Samsung has been
Apple’s long-standing supplier of processors. Through this relationship, an unintended
transfer of knowledge of Apple’s operations, technological processes and market size
forecasts to Samsung occurred (Seifert and Isaksson, 2013), and today Samsung is Apple’s
biggest competitor. Such leakage of information from one firm (that generates new
knowledge) to another (that accumulates new knowledge) is referred to as Knowledge
Spillovers (Jaffe, 1986). These spillovers can be exploited by the firm that accumulated it.
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A firm can then combine this external spillover knowledge with its own internal
capabilities, which is exemplified by Apple’s Ipod in a somewhat reversed context than the
situation with Samsung. Apple gained from the R&D and market penetration of Sony’s
Walkman, but then added its own capability, a digital music division, to that external
knowledge and launched the “21st century Walkman”, something Sony failed to
accomplish (Yastrow, 2011).
Knowledge spillovers related to R&D knowledge have been widely shown to
impact firm performance (Griliches, 1991; Knott, 2008). However, knowledge spillovers
are not limited to just R&D-related spillovers, but potentially could encompass any type of
knowledge, including operational knowledge. While the concept of operational-knowledge
spillovers has traditionally been viewed anecdotally as simply imitating operational
practices, those relationships are formalized by extending knowledge spillovers to include
spillovers of operational knowledge (Cheng and Nault, 2007; Koufteros et al., 2007).
Formally, in this dissertation the following two questions are addressed (1) the extent to
which operational-knowledge spillovers (referred to as Operational Spillovers or OM
Spillovers interchangeably) exist within the context of manufacturing firms, and (2) the
extent to which a relationship exists, if any, between operational spillovers and financial
performance of manufacturing firms. Operational spillovers related to inventory (INV),
sourcing lead time (SLT) and volume flexibility (VF) in particular are evaluated.
While it may be assumed that accumulated knowledge must have a positive impact
on financial performance, it is not necessarily true that all firms make use of the spillovers
that they accumulate. They may lack the capability to do so (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990),
as in the case of Walmart introducing two day shipping policy. Alternately, firms may not
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have sufficient funds to invest, or they may decide that the potential performance benefits
from new knowledge thus acquired do not justify the additional investment costs (Knott,
2008). Monetary investment required to exploit external spillovers can be substantially
high for firms employing traditional operational practices (Bessen, 2005; Mansfield et al.,
1981). However, technological advancements can alter how firms respond to external
spillovers, and can afford firms the ability to benefit from them at a fraction of the original
costs. The most recent example for a technological advancement is 3D printing and
additive manufacturing practices (D'Aveni, 2015). Such technological advancements can
drive imitation, which while being beneficial to the imitating firm, can be detrimental to
the innovating firm that spent significantly on manufacturing R&D to produce a highquality product (Schubert and Jost, 2015). Technological changes have been taking place
from the 1990s to the present. However, any empirical examination related to operational
spillovers and firm performance is absent.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section provides an
overview of the relevant literature in OM and other disciplines. Section 3.3 builds upon
this literature to create the resulting hypotheses. Subsequent sections present the data, the
methodology, and the results. The implications of operational spillovers for future OM
research are discussed in the concluding section of the chapter.

3.2. Related Literature
A growing body of literature has examined the existence and impact of spillovers as a
phenomenon across disciplines (Cheng and Nault, 2007; Jaffe, 1998; Zhang et al., 2010).
Prior work in this area has traditionally focused on R&D-knowledge spillovers, and is
currently in the process of identifying newer mechanisms that result in various other types
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of spillovers (Zhang et al., 2010). R&D-knowledge spillovers are typically defined as the
leakage of knowledge that has been created by another firm through its R&D endeavors,
which are then used by another firm/s for its own advancement (Jaffe, 1998).
Some of the major characteristics of spillovers are highlighted next. First, spillovers
can occur via numerous mechanisms like outsourcing, merger and alliances, employee
mobility between firms etc. (Song et al., 2003). Second, spillovers can result from both
voluntary and involuntary sharing between firms (Harhoff, 1996). For instance, Harhoff
(1996) modeled a scenario where a supplier firm can intentionally share knowledge with
its buyers and these knowledge spillovers can replace the buyers’ own R&D efforts. Third,
spillovers can arise from both new and existing processes. Fourth, spillovers can occur both
within firms (across departments) as well as between firms. They can occur across
industries, and/or across technological/geographic boundaries as well (Adams and Jaffe,
1996). Fifth, the firm(s) benefitting from spillovers may or may not be direct competitors
of the knowledge-generating firm. These firms may operate in a different industry or target
a different market. Last but not the least, spillovers have been shown to have both positive
and negative performance effects for a firm.
Scholars have examined spillover types other than R&D as well. For instance,
Cheng and Nault (2007, 2012) have shown how IT spillovers affect the variation in returns
to IT investments. Mayer (2006) examined two spillovers--knowledge and reputation on
contracting in IT firms. Knott (2008) empirically demonstrated that contrary to past
recommendations, investing more in R&D does not affect a firm’s ability to derive more
R&D spillover benefits. Spillover effects have been studied in cross-country settings as
well (Zhang et al., 2010). For example, Mayer (2006) uses transaction cost theory to
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demonstrate how poor performance of a supplier can damage its reputation, and that
reputational spillover can in turn have a negative effect on that supplier’s revenue. On the
other hand, a show of superior performance from the supplier can also lead to a positive
reputational spillover. FDI spillovers have been shown to have both positive and negative
effects on the productivity of domestic firms in emerging markets (Zhang et al., 2010).
In operations management (OM) research, both empirical and analytical studies
have directly and indirectly examined spillovers, but mostly in the context of supply chains.
These studies provide limited evidence that firms benefit from spillovers. Koufteros et al.
(2007) and Perols et al. (2013) studied knowledge spillover effects in operations, and
concluded that building embedded ties with suppliers can potentially open doors for
incoming spillover effects (via both direct and indirect ties) for the firm. Perols et al. (2013)
extended the work of Mayer (2006) by studying the effect of supplier integration on
spillover of new technology innovations, as well as the effect of technology spillover on
time-to-market. Xue et al. (2013) found that spillovers from supplier-side electronic
integration affects customer service performance. When suppliers are shared between rival
firms, any investments in the improvement of supplier capabilities by a buyer firm creates
opportunities for benefits to spill over into other buyer firms. Given such a setup, a buyer
firm’s investment decisions may be influenced by potential quality spillovers (Agrawal et
al., 2015) and/or capacity spillovers (Qi et al., 2015) and/or reliability spillovers (Wang et
al., 2014), and/or knowledge and reputational spillovers (Kang et al., 2009).
On the other side of the supply chain, spillovers can also occur when a supplier
invests in downstream buyers (Harhoff, 1996). The focal firm might choose to share the
previously owned knowledge/resources in order to increase coordination between supply
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chain partners (Yao et al., 2013). Yao et al. (2013), who investigated organizationallearning spillover effects for a manufacturing supplier firm, found that learning spillovers
do exist between product releases and posit that the learning spillovers from previous
product releases may lead to reduction in inventory levels of the newer releases. Learning
spillovers can also benefit firms in supply chain dyads (Yao et al., 2012). Andritsos and
Tang (2014) provided some indirect evidence of spillovers resulting from improved TQM
processes in a health care environment.

3.3. Theoretical Framework
Based on Jaffe’s work, a spillover framework as it pertains to different types of operational
spillovers and their impact on performance is shown in Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1. Framework for Operational Spillovers in Manufacturing Firms
(Adapted from Jaffe 1998)
Firm 1 in the figure is the firm that generates operational spillovers and is referred
to as the leader firm in the rest of the paper. The rest of the firms operating in the industry
in which Firm 1 operates, accumulate these operational spillovers. Section 3.3 further
elaborates on the Figure 3.1 and provides an explanation behind the flows of operational
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knowledge between Firm 1 and other firms. Section 3.4.4 explains how to measure the
amount of operational spillovers leaking from the leader firm to other firm/s in that
industry.

3.4. Hypotheses Development
The resource-based view (RBV) of the firm asserts that firms realize varying financial
performance outcomes because firms differ in terms of their (a) operational resources and
(b) internal capabilities to exploit those available resources. Resources can be both tangible
(e.g. Property, Plant and Equipment) and intangible (e.g. knowledge) in nature.
In the field of operations management, firms employ their internal resource of
operational knowledge to better manage inventory (INV), sourcing lead time (SLT), and
volume flexibility (VF) and turn them into profit-generating capabilities. This operationalknowledge resource and the resulting operational capabilities can be applied by the firm to
a wide variety of processes in numerous industries. In line with RBV, firms possess varying
operational capabilities due to varying resource configurations, including operationalknowledge resource. It is further posited that firms also vary in their ability to generate
operating profits through these operational capabilities. While some highly capable firms
may be able to generate significant advantage in operating profits through their operational
capabilities, other firms are likely to be not as proficient at generating operating profit via
operational capabilities. Given this, the following is hypothesized:

Hypothesis 1a: Manufacturing firms differ in their ability to impact their operating profit
via operational capabilities of inventory (INV), sourcing lead time (SLT),
volume flexibility (VF).
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Furthermore, operational-knowledge as a resource cannot be fully protected by the
more capable firm from leakage, in that other firms are continuously attempting to imitate
the more-capable firms in an effort to bring their own capabilities to a comparable level
(Barratt and Oke, 2007). Imitating firms capitalize on the operational knowledge that leaks
out from the more capable firm (also called operational-knowledge spillovers) to
complement their own internal resource of operational-knowledge for financial gains. As
such, operational-knowledge spillovers can be viewed as a potential source of intangible
resources to manufacturing firms. Given that there is significant evidence of R&Dknowledge spillovers (Knott, 2008; López-Pueyo et al., 2008); and strong indication from
industry examples and recent changes in manufacturing practices, as discussed in the
introduction section, operational-knowledge spillovers are expected to occur. Whereas
some firms will be able to exploit these spillovers, others will be unable to effectively
utilize such resources. In this chapter, it is contended that not all firms will have the
necessary level of skill required to successfully imitate these operational capabilities that
were built upon the more sophisticated bundle of operational-knowledge resource of the
leading firm (s). Given this, the following is hypothesized:

Hypothesis 1b: Manufacturing firms differ in their ability to impact their operating profit
via operational spillovers.
When evaluating the level of operational capabilities required by firms, extant
research has consistently suggested that there is an optimal level for these capabilities such
that exceeding this level or falling short of this level leads to sub-optimal performance (De
Treville et al., 2004; Eroglu and Hofer, 2011; Jack and Raturi, 2002). Firms with
capabilities near their optimal point also possess an optimal level of resources, as they
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pertain to RBV.

Firms with too few resources can be viewed as being

resource

constrained, while firms with too many resources are subject to resource underutilization
(Grewal and Slotegraaf, 2007; Paeleman and Vanacker, 2015; Sirmon and Hitt, 2009;
Sirmon et al., 2010). Within the framework of the current research, the concept of
operational elasticity or OM elasticity is developed here for the first time in literature. OM
elasticity gauges the extent to which an additional unit of operational capability impacts
operating profit. By calculating a firm’s OM elasticity, it is possible to understand where
the firm falls in relation to its optimal level of a given operational capability.
A negative value of OM elasticity indicates that operating profit increases
(decreases) as the operational-capability level decreases (increases). Such a condition is
indicative of a firm with an ‘under-developed’ potential to profit from operational
capabilities. Taking the example of INV, firms with a negative INV elasticity possess
excess levels of inventory, such that any further increase in the inventory held results in
decreased operating profit. Conversely, a positive OM elasticity indicates that operating
profit increases (decreases) as operational-capability level increases (decreases). This
condition is indicative of a firm with an ‘over-developed’ potential to profit from
operational capabilities. In the case of INV, these firms have the potential to profit from an
increase in inventory, but they remain inventory-constrained, and hence potentially end up
losing sales due to inventory shortages. Their operating profit would increase if they held
additional units of inventory. Taken together, as a firm’s OM elasticity nears zero, the
firm’s operating profit becomes increasingly more insensitive to changes in the levels of
INV, SLT, and VF. It is contended that firms near optimal levels of operational capabilities
are less sensitive to small changes in those levels, since the resulting level is still very near
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optimal. However, firms that are very far from optimal levels are much more sensitive to
changes. Within RBV parlance, firms near their optimal OM elasticity have an optimal
level of capabilities such that they are able to optimally utilize their resources. Resource
levels diverging from this level results in constrained resource or excess resource
conditions, resulting in sub-optimal resource utilization. This logic leads us to the
following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: There is an inverted-U relationship between the extent (as measured by OM
elasticity) to which manufacturing firms derive operating profits from
operational capabilities and their financial performance.
The ever-growing literature on determinants of firm performance have recognized
both in-house innovation and imitation of competitors as strategies to enhance financial
outcomes (Jenkins, 2014; Lavie, 2006; Schubert and Jost, 2015). Maintaining this in terms
of resources, an interaction of development of internal resources as well as imitation of
external resources from competitors has been shown to augment firm profitability (Lavie,
2006). Hence, it is expected that manufacturing firms would be able to financially benefit
from external operational-knowledge resources from its competitors more so when
complemented by their internal capabilities. For this research, this relationship is slightly
complicated by the fundamental anchoring of the operational capability in question. In
terms of INV capability, lower amounts of inventory are considered ‘better’ for a firm.
Hence, the goal of the firm is to increase its INV capability by lowering the amounts of
inventory held. Similarly, in terms of SLT capability, shorter lead times are considered
‘better’ for a firm. However, VF, is oriented in the opposite direction wherein higher the
VF, the better for the firm because the goal of a firm is to increase its VF capability by
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becoming increasingly flexible. This holds true for all firms regardless of their level of OM
elasticity, or in which direction the firm is away from zero.
Hence, drawing upon RBV, it is expected that firms regardless of where they lie on
the curve (i.e. regardless of the level of OM elasticity) will benefit positively from external
resources of operational-knowledge that spills over from its competitors. Such spillovers
can aid the firm in transforming their own operational capabilities towards more optimal
levels. Considering again the example of INV, external INV spillovers are expected to
benefit the firms in further lowering their inventory investments. A positive spillover
elasticity indicates that operating profit increases (decreases) as the pool of operationalknowledge spillovers increases(decreases). A firm with a positive spillover elasticity
possesses an enhanced ability to exploit the external-operational-knowledge spillovers
compared to a firm with a negative spillover elasticity. To conclude, it is posited that
exploiting external spillover resources can move the firm towards increased financial
outcomes when complemented by its existing capabilities. Taken together, the following
hypothesis is proposed:

Hypothesis 3: The relationship between operational capabilities (in terms of INV, SLT,
and VF) and financial performance of manufacturing firms is positively
moderated by an increased ability to exploit the corresponding
operational-spillovers (as measured by OM spillover elasticity).
3.5. Data and Measures
The target sample for this research is US manufacturing firms (SIC codes in the range of
2000 and 3999). Firm-level annual data was collected over the period 1990-2016 from
COMPUSTAT. Firms included in the sample came from the domestic population that
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traded in USD currency only, and comprised both active and inactive firms. Firms are
considered active if they are currently carrying out trading activities like selling
goods/services and so their accounting transaction are ongoing. Inactive firms comprise
previously active firms that are not trading goods/services at present. From this sample,
firm-year observations were deleted if they contained zero (=4300 observations
approximately) and/or negative (=29 observations) values for key variables. For example,
a negative value of sales is considered as erroneous, and the corresponding observation
was deleted. Next, all missing R&D values were converted to zero as per (Chauvin and
Hirschey, 1993; Hirschey et al., 2012). Next, firms that generated less than $30 million
revenue in total over the 27 year period (=887 firms) were dropped (Rumyantsev and
Netessine, 2007). This process resulted in an unbalanced panel data set consisting of 220
industries and 5668 firms, with a grand total of 66,569 firm-year observations. The final
sample was partially complete i.e. both the dependent and independent variables contained
missing values. Stata commands used for the analyses are already equipped to handle such
data as they have built-in list-wise deletion. Actual sample varies across the different
models estimated as the list of variables used varies across models. Actual sample used is
presented in the Analysis and Results section 3.5 below each model’s results. The creation
of measures is discussed next.

3.5.1

Inventory (INV)

Inventory investments by firm i in year t is calculated as ½ (total inventoryt + total
inventoryt-1) (Jain et al., 2013). It is then normalized by firm size (measured by total assets),
and winsorized (95 5 percentile) to remove outliers. Firms with smaller inventory
investments are better in terms of inventory management.
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3.5.2

Sourcing Lead Time (SLT)

In this chapter, the type of lead time considered is sourcing lead time, defined as the time
it takes for a firm to receive materials from its suppliers. In line with Rumyantsev and
Netessine (2007), SLT is operationalized as the average number of days of accounts
payable outstanding. Although days of accounts payable cannot exactly replace the actual
lead time data which is not available from public data sources, it has been shown to follow
the same relationships with inventory and firm performance (Rumyantsev and Netessine,
2007). Hence, Sourcing Lead Timeit = 365/[( COGSit) / APit], for firm i in year t, where
APit refers to accounts payable and COGSit refers to the cost of goods sold. It is then
normalized by firm size (measured by total assets), and winsorized (95 5 percentile) to
remove outliers. In line with their work, the distribution of SLT was cross-checked to
confirm that it did not show any questionable spikes and had an almost normal distribution
verifying that majority of the data for the SLT proxy did not comprise of any contractually
set payment schedules between firms. Firms with shorter lead times are considered better.

3.5.3

Volume flexibility (VF)

Manufacturing flexibility is multi-dimensional construct and is well-established as a
competitive priority for firms used in responding to changes in demand by changing
capacity, or in other words, production levels (Koste and Malhotra, 1999; Zhang et al.,
2003). Pagell and Krause (2004) emphasize a re-evaluation of the flexibility-related
findings given today’s socio-economic conditions. One of its dimensions, volume
flexibility, defined as “the ability to effectively increase or decrease aggregate production
in response to customers” (Pagell and Krause, 2004) has gained renewed importance in the

50

last decade given the ongoing advancements in digitization and 3D printing (D'Aveni,
2015). Volume flexibility permits a firm to increase or decrease production levels (da
Silveira, 2006; Upton, 1994) without experiencing “large changes in performance
outcomes” (Koste and Malhotra, 1999).
Volume flexibility (VF) is operationalized as the average percentage change in
production calculated over a five-year period. First, production for firm i in year t is
calculated as (cost of goods soldt + inventoryt – inventoryt-1) (Bray and Mendelson, 2012).
140 observations had a negative production value and were dropped from the sample.
Production is then normalized by firm size (measured by total assets). Next, the rate of
change of production is calculated, taken as an absolute value to capture both upward and
downward VF. It is then averaged out over a five-year period (t to t-4) and winsorized (95
5 percentile) to get the final measure. Firms with a higher value are considered more
flexible. It must also be noted that other than taking average of production rate change over
five years, using the maximum value also led to consistent results.

3.5.4 Operational Spillovers
The pool of external spillovers available to a firm was calculated using the ‘leader distance’
functional form (Eeckhout and Jovanovic, 2002; Nelson and Winter, 1982). Leader
distance for a firm i within an industry y (at the 4-digit SIC level) in year t is the difference
between the focal firm i and the industry leader in terms of the operational variable of
interest. Leader distance form was chosen because it takes into account heterogeneity of
the firms (Klepper, 1996; Knott, 2008). The term ‘industry leader’ does not necessarily
imply a firm that has the highest financial performance. In fact, industry leader is
characterized in terms of its standing with respect to INV, SLT, and VF. In terms of INV,
51

the industry leader is the firm that has the lowest inventory investments relative to all other
firms in that industry in a given year. In terms of SLT, the industry leader is the firm that
has the shortest lead times relative to all other firms in that industry in a given year. In
terms of VF, a higher value is considered to be better, thus the industry leader is the firm
that has the highest VF relative to all other firms in that industry in a given year. Given the
calculation of leader distance measure of operational spillovers, the leader firm itself would
have a spillover pool value of zero. That is, the financial profits (or losses) accrued by the
leader firm are purely from its own operational capabilities (refer to Figure 3.1). On the
other hand, the financial profits (or losses) accrued by the rest of the firms are a result of
their existing operational capabilities as well as the accumulated operational spillovers
(Jaffe, 1998). Since the focus of this research is on the impact of operational spillovers on
financial performance, consequently, the subsequent data analysis does not include the
leader firms.

3.5.5

Dependent Variables and Control Variables

To test H1 and calculate firm-specific elasticities, the dependent variable used is firm
operational performance, which is operationalized as Operating Profit (OP). Operating
profit is calculated as the difference between a firm’s revenues and its cost of goods sold
(COGS). To test H2 and H3, the dependent variable used is firm financial performance,
which is measured in two ways (a) Return on Sales (ROS), and (b) Return on Assets (ROA).
ROS is calculated as net income divided by total sales, and ROA is calculated as net income
divided by total assets. All three measures were winsorized (95 5 percentile) to remove
outliers. Finally, the following variables are used as firm-level controls. Net property, plant,
and equipment is used as a proxy for firm capital, and number of employees is used as a
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proxy for labor. A one-year lagged value of R&D expenditure is included to account for
the potential lag between innovation initiatives (as reflected by R&D investment) and
realization of financial profits (Knott, 2008). Leverage, which is calculated as total
liabilities divided by total assets of a firm i in year t, is used as a control for H2 and H3.
Table 3.1 shows the descriptive statistics. Table 3.2 presents the correlation matrix
calculated using list wise deletion. Hence, the sample size (N=25,664) is smaller than the
size of the actual dataset.
Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics

Variable

Obs

ln(Capital)
ln(Labor)
ln(R&D)
ln(OP)
ROS
ROA

53,032
53,032
53,032
53,032
53,031
53,031

Mean Median
3.359
-0.169
-1.193
3.982
-0.064
-0.026

3.294
-0.234
0.831
3.963
0.027
0.031

SD
2.632
2.020
5.418
2.169
0.296
0.184

Min

Max

-6.908 12.517
-6.908 6.414
-9.210 9.549
-0.794 9.175
-1.605 0.235
-0.790 0.201

3.6. Analysis and Results
To better understand the effects of operational spillovers, the analysis begins by first verify
the heterogeneity of firms (H1 results) and then calculating OM elasticity and spillover
elasticity measures. Then, the effect of OM elasticity on firm’s financial performance in
the presence of operational spillovers is discussed (H2 & H3 results). For each dependent
variable, three models are estimated-one for each of the three operational measures.
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Table 3.2. Correlations Table
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Variables
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Ln(OP)
1
Ln(Capital)
0.88
1
Ln(Labor)
0.90
0.93
1
Ln(Lagged R&D)
0.31
0.22
0.23
1
b
Leverage
-0.01
0.01
0.04 -0.05
1
Ln(INV)
-0.33 -0.33 -0.23 -0.28
0.08
1
Ln(INV Spillover)
-0.33 -0.34 -0.27 -0.14
0.05
0.83
1
b
Ln(SLT)
-0.91 -0.93 -0.91 -0.24 0.01
0.34
0.35
Ln(SLT Spillover)
-0.89 -0.92 -0.91 -0.24
0.03
0.33
0.35
Ln(VF)
-0.33 -0.34 -0.40
0.10
0.03 -0.18 -0.03
Ln(VF Spillover)
-0.04 -0.10 -0.11
0.27 -0.06 -0.21
0.01
ROS
0.41
0.29
0.32 -0.03 -0.22 0.00b -0.04
ROA
0.42
0.32
0.33 -0.01b -0.26 -0.09 -0.13
INV Elasticity
-0.12 0.01b -0.04 -0.06
0.05 -0.01b -0.01b
INV-Spillover Elasticity -0.06 -0.01b -0.03 -0.03
0.02 -0.04 0.00b
SLT Elasticity
-0.24 -0.20 -0.22 -0.03 -0.02 0.00b
0.03
b
b
b
SLT-Spillover Elasticity -0.04 0.00 -0.01
0.05 0.00
-0.03 -0.02
b
b
VF Elasticity
0.01
0.08
0.10 -0.01
0.05
0.07
0.03
b
VF Spillover Elasticity
-0.06 -0.05 -0.04
0.04 -0.01
0.02
0.04

8

1
0.98
0.33
0.10
-0.33
-0.36
0.06
0.05
0.20
0.00b
-0.06
0.05

9

10

11

12

13

1
0.34
1
0.10 0.19
1
-0.33 -0.36 -0.09
1
-0.36 -0.35 -0.08 0.88
1
0.06 0.07 -0.02 -0.15 -0.12
0.05 0.07 0.02 -0.11 -0.08
0.21 0.15 0.07 -0.19 -0.16
0.01b 0.04 0.02 -0.10 -0.07
-0.07 -0.11 -0.05 0.01 0.00b
0.05 0.04 0.03 -0.02 -0.02

N=25,664; All correlations are significant at p<0.05 unless indicated with b.

Table 3.2. Continued

14
15
16
17
18
14 INV Elasticity
1
15 INV-Spillover Elasticity 0.52
1
16 SLT Elasticity
0.15 0.17
1
17 SLT-Spillover Elasticity 0.12 0.14 0.65
1
18 VF Elasticity
-0.04 -0.04 -0.07 -0.01
1
19 VF Spillover Elasticity
0.05 0.08 0.04 0.03 -0.15

3.6.1

Calculation of Firm-Specific Elasticities

To generate firm-specific elasticities, Random Coefficient Modeling (RCM) was used.
RCM is an extension of linear regression models, used to handle clustered panel data. The
intercept as well as the slopes can vary across clusters in RCM. For a panel data set, the
RCM equation (with one explanatory variable) is represented by Yit = (β0 + u0i) + (β1 + u1i)
Xit + εit for firm i and time t. Each coefficient (for intercept and explanatory variables) has
two parts- a mean (or fixed) component (denoted by βi), and a random component (denoted
by ui). The mean component (βi) is the same for each firm. The random component is
unique to each firm. The random component (unlike the mean component) is not directly
estimated, but a Best Linear Unbiased Prediction is calculated instead. RCM allows for the
study of individual firms’ responses, both those included in the sample and those outside
the sample, and are referred as “firm-specific effects” (Alcácer et al., 2013). RCM is an
appropriate technique for the purposes of this research, where the purpose is to estimate
marginal effects of operational inputs and spillovers in the presence of firm heterogeneity.
Equation 1 represents the RCM model for firm i and time t used to generate the elasticities.
ln(Y)it = (β0 + u0i) + (β1 + u1i) ln(K)it + (β2 + u2i) ln(L)it + (β3 + u3i) ln(R)it-1
+ (β4 + u4i) ln(O)it + (β5 + u5i) ln(S)it + εit
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(1)

where Y is firm’s operating profit, K denotes capital, L denotes labor, R is R&D,
O refers to one of the three operational measures, and S denotes the corresponding
operational spillover. Any zero values for explanatory variables were converted to a 0.0001
before taking natural log to avoid the problem with log-transformation of zero.
Stata’s linear-mixed-model command was used to estimate the model. A separate
model was run for each operational measure. Analysis was done in line with the mixedmodel estimation process, running a null model first and then testing for significance of
each added effect (using the likelihood ratio test) eventually building up to a full model
including all fixed and random effects. Table 3.3 shows the RCM results for INV, SLT,
and VF.
Table 3.3. RCM Results

DV=Ln(OP)

(1)

(2)

(3)

Variables

OM = INV

OM = SLT

OM= VF

Ln(Capital)

0.191***
(0.007)

0.079***
(0.007)

0.189***
(0.008)

Ln(Labor)

0.667***
(0.010)

0.564***
(0.010)

0.674***
(0.013)

Ln(Lagged R&D)

0.051***
(0.003)

0.033***
(0.002)

0.061***
(0.003)

Ln(OM)

-0.160***
(0.012)

-0.304***
(0.011)

-0.033***
(0.009)

Ln(Spillover)

0.014*
(0.007)

0.042***
(0.008)

0.003
(0.003)

Constant

3.077***
(0.027)

3.395***
(0.024)

3.456***
(0.035)

52921

53032

29778

N
*

p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; Standard errors are in parentheses and are two-way cluster robust.
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The coefficients for capital, labor and R&D are all positive and comparable across
the three operational measures (OM) (INV, SLT, and VF), which is as expected because
any investment by a firm is done only to increase its profits. Table 3.3 only provides
information about the direct/average component of OM elasticity and spillover elasticity.
In all three models (#1-3), the average effect of the operational measure is negative on a
firm’s profit and the average effect of the corresponding OM spillover is positive on firm’s
profit for the entire sample after accounting for firm heterogeneity. To verify that these
effects differ across firms with respect to OM and OM-spillover pool, the variance of the
direct component was checked for statistical significance. Stata reports these statistics post
estimations. For each of the three measures, the variance for the direct component of the
operational measure was found to be statistically significant with a p-value<0.001 (tstatistic for INV = -41.4, for SLT = -51.6, for VF = -39.5). Similarly, the variance for the
direct component of the corresponding OM spillover was also found to be statistically
significant with a p-value<0.001 (t-statistic for INV = -44.0, for SLT = -27.2, for VF = 51.1).
For each of the three operational measures (INV, SLT, and VF), firm-specific
elasticities were then calculated by adding both the mean and random components. In other
words, OM elasticity is calculated as (β4 + u4i) and OM-spillover elasticity calculated as
(β5 + u5i). The descriptive statistics for the two elasticity measures for all three operational
measures are shown in Table 3.4. For example, in the case of INV (Model 1 in Table 3.4),
the INV elasticity of a firm is its ability to generate profit from its own inventory
investments and it ranges from -1.024 (lowest) to 1.36 (highest) in this sample. The INV
spillover elasticity ranges from -0.566 (lowest) to 0.68 (highest) in this sample.

57

Table 3.4. Descriptive Statistics for Firm-Specific Elasticities

Elasticities

Obs

Mean

SD

Min

Max

Model 1- Inventory (INV)
OM Elasticity

52,921 -0.167 0.177 -1.024 1.360

Spillover Elasticity

52,921

0.013 0.071 -0.566 0.680

Model 2- Lead Time (SLT)
OM Elasticity

53,032 -0.318 0.196 -1.431 1.498

Spillover Elasticity

53,032

0.041 0.045 -0.284 0.727

Model 3- Volume Flexibility (VF)
OM Elasticity

29,778 -0.031 0.144 -1.157 0.787

Spillover Elasticity

29,778

0.002 0.058 -0.526 0.508

Figures 3.2-3.4 present the histograms for firm-specific OM elasticities for INV,

1000
500
0

Number of Manufacturing Firms

1500

SLT, and VF respectively.

-1

-.5

0

.5

1

OM Elasticity for Inventory

Figure 3.2. Histogram of Firm-Specific OM Elasticities for INV
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Figure 3.3. Histogram of Firm-Specific OM Elasticities for SLT
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Figure 3.4. Histogram of Firm-Specific OM Elasticities for VF
Figures 3.5-3.7 present the histograms for firm-specific spillover elasticities for
INV, SLT, and VF respectively.
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Figure 3.6. Histogram of Firm-Specific Spillover Elasticities for SLT
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Figure 3.7. Histogram of Firm-Specific Spillover Elasticities for VF
The histograms together with the reported t-test results collectively lend support to
the first hypothesis H1. Thus, there is considerable variance across firms in terms of the
extent to which a firm’s operational measure (OM) influences its profit, and the extent to
which the corresponding OM spillover influences its profit.
As expected, OM elasticity and OM-spillover elasticity is negative for a subset of
firms in the sample, and positive for the rest. This implies that for a 1% increase in, say,
inventory investments, the OP would decrease for a firm with a low INV elasticity while
the OP would increase for a firm with a high INV elasticity. A firm i’s elasticity is generally
regarded as being low or high relative to another firm. However, to aide ease of
understanding, a negative elasticity value is referred to as low elasticity and a positive
elasticity value is referred to as high elasticity from here onwards.
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3.6.2

Quadratic Nature of OM Elasticity

To test the second hypothesis H2, an OLS regression was run as shown in equation 2, with
a double-clustered robust error structure (Cameron et al., 2011; Mackelprang and Malhotra,
2015). Firm size (proxy used is ln(#employees)), R&D, leverage, time, and industry (4digit level) effects were included as control variables.
Yit = β1 ln(X1)it + β2 X2it + β3 (X2*X2)it + β4 ln(L)it + β5 ln(R)it-1 + β6
ln(Z)it + β7 (no. of years) + industry dummies + εit

(2)

where Y is firm’s financial performance (ROA/ROS), X1 is one of the three operational
measures, X2 is the corresponding OM elasticity of that operational measure, ln(L) is firm
size, R is the one-year lagged R&D value, and Z denotes leverage for firm i and time t.
Results for hypothesis H2 are summarized in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5. OLS Regression Results for Hypothesis 2
(4)

(5)

(6)

OM = INV
Variables

ROA

ROS

(7)

OM = SLT
ROA

ROS

(8)

(9)

OM = VF
ROA

ROS

Ln(Lagged R&D) -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.008*** -0.002*** -0.004***
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.001)
No. of Years

-0.002***
(0.000)

-0.001
(0.001)

Ln(Labor)

0.032***
(0.002)

0.053***
(0.004)

Leverage

-0.022
(0.012)

-0.030*
(0.015)

Ln(OM)

-0.008*
(0.003)

0.044***
(0.008)

OM Elasticity

-0.110*** -0.216***
(0.011)
(0.024)

-0.003*** -0.004***
(0.000)
(0.001)

-0.000
(0.001)

0.001
(0.001)

0.001
(0.002)

0.022***
(0.005)

0.021***
(0.001)

0.030***
(0.002)

-0.022*
(0.011)

-0.028*
(0.013)

-0.078*** -0.094***
(0.017)
(0.018)

-0.038*** -0.038*** -0.058*** -0.091***
(0.002)
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.008)
-0.037**
(0.011)
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-0.085*** -0.056*** -0.078***
(0.022)
(0.014)
(0.023)

OM Elasticity^2

N
*

-0.136*** -0.288*** -0.097*** -0.222***
(0.037)
(0.066)
(0.024)
(0.047)
52838

52838

52944

52944

-0.092*
(0.038)

-0.233**
(0.072)

29729

29729

p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; Standard errors (SE) are in parentheses and are two-way cluster robust

Results of industry dummies are not shown in the interest of brevity. The Variance
Inflation Factor (VIF) for all models was less than 4, implying that multicollinearity was
not an issue. The interpretation of these results for each operational measure is discussed
next.

3.6.2.1 Inventory (INV)
Models 4 and 5 (ROA & ROS respectively) present the results of regressing firm financial
performance on the INV elasticity. Both the linear and quadratic term for INV are
significant and negative with a p-value< 0.001. The results indicate a concave or an
inverted-U relationship between INV elasticity, and ROA and ROS lending support to H2.
The concave curve is such that the maximum predicted value of ROA and ROS occurs at
an elasticity value close to zero (-0.5). This implies that firms whose INV elasticity is closer
to zero, are expected to reap the maximum financial gains (in terms of ROA and ROS)
from INV. The inverted-U relationship also indicates that as you move farther away to the
left of the curve, i.e. the INV elasticity goes increasingly negative, and the financial benefits
steadily decrease. Firms that fall on the farther left side of the curve, while being less
capable in converting inventory investments into operating profits, arguably compensate
by holding excess inventory which ultimately results in the firm suffering financial losses.
Similarly, as you move farther away to the right of the curve, i.e. the INV elasticity
goes increasingly positive, but the financial benefits again steadily decrease. This is in line
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with what is hypothesized. Firms lying on the farther right side, are exceedingly capable in
converting inventory investments into operating profits, but contrary to intuition, they are
not the ones that are financially more profitable. The understanding is that these firms are
straddling the point of being overly lean (Eroglu and Hofer, 2011), i.e. they are holding the
least possible amounts of inventory resulting in inventory shortages and eventual loss of
sales. Perhaps their strategy is to stay as close to the leader (defined as the firm with lowest
inventory investments) as possible. They are considering only the absolute inventory
investments when implementing their operational policies and not their INV elasticity,
which if included in the decision-making analysis, can completely change the picture. If
these firms were to in fact increase their inventory investments, they could derive improved
firm profitability by capturing lost sales.

3.6.2.2 Sourcing Lead Time (SLT)
Models 6 and 7 (ROA & ROS respectively) present the results of regressing firm
profitability on OM elasticity in terms of SLT. Both the linear and quadratic term for SLT
are significant and negative with a p-value< 0.01. The results indicate a concave
relationship or an inverted-U between SLT elasticity, and ROA and ROS lending support
to H2. The concave curve is such that the maximum predicted value of ROA and ROS
occurs at an elasticity value close to zero (-0.2). This implies that firms whose SLT
elasticity is closer to zero, are expected to reap the maximum financial gains (in terms of
ROA and ROS) from SLT capability. These firms are in fact, almost financially immune
to small changes in SLT. It is the firms that lie to the farther left and farther right of these
firms that are highly sensitive to any changes in SLT. Like INV, firms that lie to the left
are operationally ‘less capable’ in terms of SLT while those on the right are operationally
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‘exceedingly capable’. In general, longer SLTs imply longer intervals between deliveries
from suppliers, and in turn indicates more inventory in holding. Shorter SLTs, on the other
hand, imply less inventory in holding which in turn echoes leaner operations. Shorter SLT
is a marker of leaner operations, however too much lean can turn into a riskier proposition
(Eroglu and Hofer, 2011). Any unplanned changes in production or unexpected errors, or
unpredictable spikes in demand can throw-off the entire production system, thus resulting
in financial distress. The exceedingly-capable firms are arguably trying to stay as close as
possible to the leader firm (defined as the firm with the shortest lead-time) in terms of SLT;
however, they are not able to adequately address changes in demand because of inventory
shortages resulting from shorter SLTs. The less-capable firms, on the other hand, are
holding excess inventory as reflected from longer SLTs, and hence suffering financially. It
is possible that these are the firms that sell products associated with higher margins and
want to avoid stock-outs at any cost (Rumyantsev and Netessine, 2007).

3.6.2.3 Volume flexibility (VF)
Models 8 and 9 (ROA & ROS respectively) present the results of regressing firm
profitability on VF elasticity. Both the linear and quadratic term for VF are significant and
negative with a p-value< 0.01. The results indicate a concave relationship or an invertedU between VF elasticity, and ROA and ROS lending support to H2. The concave curve is
such that the maximum predicted value of ROA and ROS occurs at an elasticity value close
to zero (-0.2). This implies that firms whose VF elasticity is closer to zero, are expected to
reap the maximum financial gains (in terms of ROA and ROS) from VF. In a similar vein
as INV and SLT, firms that are closer to zero are almost financially immune to small
changes in VF. Additionally, both, firms to the farther left as well as to the farther right of
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the curve, are financially inferior to firms that have almost zero VF elasticity. It should be
recalled that, unlike SLT and INV, a higher level of VF is considered better for a firm. The
left side of the curve comprises of firms with a low VF elasticity, indicative of firms that
have too much VF. For these firms, an increase in volume flexible capabilities would
simply provide additional capabilities when the current level is adequate, resulting in
decreased ROS and ROA. Firms on the right side of the curve have an insufficient level of
VF, such that they are unable to meet demand effectively resulting in diminished financial
performance.
However, it is possible that these firms are compensating for the lack of capabilities
by exploiting external spillovers from the leader firm. Hence, the potential moderating role
of spillover elasticity on OM elasticity→ financial performance link is discussed next.
3.6.3

Moderating Effect of Spillover Elasticity

To test the third hypothesis H3, the model presented in equation 2 was extended to include
spillover elasticity as a moderator. Results for hypothesis H3 are summarized in Table 3.6.
Table 3.6. OLS Regression Results for Hypothesis 3
(10)

(11)

(12)

OM=INV
Variables

ROA

(13)

OM=SLT

ROS

ROA

ROS

(14)

(15)

OM= VF
ROA

ROS

Ln(Lagged R&D)

-0.004*** -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.008*** -0.002*** -0.004***
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.001)

No. of Years

-0.002***
(0.000)

-0.001
(0.001)

Ln(Labor)

0.032***
(0.002)

0.053***
(0.004)

Leverage

-0.022

-0.029*

-0.003*** -0.004***
(0.000)
(0.001)

-0.000
(0.001)

0.001
(0.001)

0.000
(0.002)

0.020***
(0.004)

0.021***
(0.001)

0.030***
(0.002)

-0.022*

-0.028*

-0.078*** -0.094***
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Ln(OM)

(0.012)

(0.015)

-0.009*
(0.003)

0.043***
(0.008)

(0.011)

(0.013)

(0.017)

(0.018)

-0.038*** -0.039*** -0.058*** -0.091***
(0.002)
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.008)

OM Elasticity

-0.111*** -0.210***
(0.014)
(0.028)

OM Elasticity^2

-0.232*** -0.433*** -0.194*** -0.468***
(0.043)
(0.074)
(0.036)
(0.069)

-0.076
(0.045)

-0.210*
(0.090)

Spillover Elasticity

-0.106**
(0.038)

-0.200**
(0.074)

-0.073
(0.071)

-0.277*
(0.133)

0.043
(0.042)

0.090
(0.077)

OM Elasticity*
Spillover Elasticity

0.049
(0.069)

0.049
(0.130)

-0.205
(0.201)

-0.115
(0.375)

0.374***
(0.102)

0.644**
(0.229)

OM Elasticity^2*
Spillover Elasticity

0.543***
(0.097)

0.852***
(0.167)

0.761***
(0.165)

1.575***
(0.331)

0.318
(0.166)

0.564
(0.318)

52838

52838

52944

52944

29729

29729

N
*

-0.054**
(0.018)

-0.115*** -0.052***
(0.031)
(0.013)

-0.070**
(0.024)

p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; Standard errors in parentheses and are two-way cluster robust

Similar to testing for H2, a double-clustered robust error structure (Cameron et al.,
2011; Mackelprang and Malhotra, 2015) was used in the estimation of the OLS regression.
R&D, firm size (proxy used is ln(#employees)), leverage, time, and industry (4-digit level)
effects were included as control variables. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for all
models was less than 4, implying that multicollinearity was not an issue. The interpretation
of these results for each operational measure is discussed next.

3.6.3.1 Inventory (INV)
Models 10 and 11 (ROA & ROS respectively) in Table 3.6 present the results for the
moderating effect of INV spillover elasticity. The interaction of spillover elasticity with
the quadratic term of INV elasticity is significant with a p-value less than 0.001. The results
show that, spillover elasticity moderates the quadratic association between INV elasticity
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and financial performance. Graphically the interaction is presented in Figures 3.8 and 3.9
for ROA and ROS respectively. These graphical results further indicate that the impact of
INV spillovers varies depending on the position of the firm on the inverted-U curve of INV
elasticity. Not all firms benefit from an increased ability to learn from INV spillovers.

Figure 3.8. Interaction Plot: DV=ROA and OM = INV

Figure 3.9. Interaction Plot: DV=ROS and OM = INV
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Firms that are near optimal (INV elasticity near zero) have the highest performance
and do not learn from spillovers—in this case any learning from INV spillovers would
result in less optimal inventory practices. The firms lying on the left side of the quadratic
curve of INV elasticity hold inventory in excess, while the firms on the right side of the
curve are inventory constrained. Firms on the left have inadequate INV capabilities, and
can benefit from learning. They can successfully compensate and improve their inventory
practices through learning from operational spillovers. Those that are unable to do so
perform relatively worse as they are unable to improve their INV capabilities and continue
to absorb the costs of excess inventory. Firms on the right side of the curve have excessive
INV capabilities. They are already too lean, and learning to be even more lean via INV
spillovers results in lost sales and lower financial performance. They would be much better
off if they focus solely on internal INV capability. While counterintuitive, it is a key finding
that is nevertheless consistent with RBV. Hence, H3 is partially supported.

3.6.3.2 Sourcing Lead Time (SLT)
Models 12 and 13 (ROA & ROS respectively) in Table 3.6 present the results for the
moderating role of SLT-spillover elasticity. The interaction of spillover elasticity with the
quadratic term of SLT elasticity is significant with a p-value less than 0.001. In other words,
spillover elasticity moderates the quadratic association between lead-time elasticity and
financial performance. Figures 3.10 and 3.11 present the interaction results graphically for
ROA and ROS respectively. The overall results for SLT are like those for INV, whereby
not all firms benefit from an increased ability to learn from lead-time spillovers. For firms
with longer SLTs, the only way to financially gain would be to positively enhance one’s
lead-time-spillover elasticity, that is learning to reduce their SLTs via operational
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spillovers. On the right side of the curve, there is little difference between the firms that
learn via spillovers and those that do not learn from spillovers. Thus, the bulk of the
moderation occurs in those firms that do not have excess capabilities related to SLT.
Figures 3.10 and 3.11 together with Table 3.6 results partially confirm H3. The moderation
effect is strongest in the case of SLT as observed in Table 3.6. Furthermore, in the case of
SLT, firms tend to experience an even higher moderating impact of increase in spillover
elasticity in the case of ROS.

Figure 3.10. Interaction Plot: DV=ROA and OM = SLT
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Figure 3.11. Interaction Plot: DV=ROS and OM = SLT

3.6.3.3 Volume flexibility (VF)
Models 14 and 15 (ROA & ROS respectively) in Table 3.6 present the results for the
moderating role of VF spillover elasticity. The interaction of spillover elasticity with the
quadratic term of VF elasticity is not significant (at a p-value less than 0.05). However, the
magnitude of the interaction effect is considerable (0.553). Graphically the interaction is
presented in Figures 3.12 and 3.13 for ROA and ROS respectively, and mirrors INV results
except for the quadratic association. Learning helps when lacking VF capabilities, and
hurts when excess VF capabilities are present. Recall that unlike INV and SLT, a higher
value is considered better in terms of VF. The graphs indicate that, firms that can learn
from spillovers perform better among the group of firms that rank too low on the VF scale
compared to firms that cannot learn from spillovers. The opposite is true for the category
of highly-flexible firms. On the left side of the curve, lie firms that already have too much
VF such that any further increase hurts them financially.
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Figure 3.12. Interaction Plot: DV=ROA and OM = VF

Figure 3.13. Interaction Plot: DV=ROS and OM = VF
Among these firms, those that do not learn from external spillovers tend to perform
better than firms that do learn. This is because since these firms already have too much VF,
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any further increase resulting from learning from spillovers will negatively impact them.
Hence H3 is partially supported.
Firms on the right side of the curve are the ones that can in fact benefit from an
increase in VF. Hence, these firms might be able to extract benefit from VF spillovers that
compensates for their low levels of VF. Unlike INV, VF as an operational capability
comprises many sub-capabilities like processing of different types of products, improving
quality of products, reduction in production cost, and responding to uncertain spikes in
demand. The spillover pools used in the analysis reflect the gap between the leader firm
and the focal firm in terms of VF as a whole, but does not differentiate between the different
types of spillovers in terms of the different types of sub-capabilities within the umbrella of
VF. Hence, it can be argued that the highly capable firm might learn about improving a sub
capability, for example, reduction in time when changing between products. This can
potentially bring down the costs for the focal firm, in turn positively affecting ROA and
ROS. In such a scenario, the recommendation would be to learn from external spillovers
on how to improve the various sub-capabilities.

3.6.4

Endogeneity Test

Stata’s -IVREG2H- module that implements Lewbel’s approach was used to test for
endogeneity of the two elasticity measures (Baum et al., 2012; Lewbel, 2012). Lewbel’s
approach allows for testing of endogeneity including overidentification tests in the absence
of traditional type of instrumental variables, as long as the model has at least one exogenous
variable. His method generates instruments from within the data instead by using the
available set of exogenous regressors. These generated instruments can then be tested for
validity and overidentification as part of postestimation of -IVREG2H-. For the purposes
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of this research, the control variables used in all six models, served as exogenous regressors
for the procedure. Double-clustered (firm and time) error structure was used to estimate
the instrumental variables regression. -IVREG2H- reports the Hansen’s J statistic of
overidentifying restrictions of the generated instruments. Table 3.7 presents the results for
each of models 4 to 9. All p-values are greater than 0.05. Failure to reject the null
hypothesis collectively lead us to conclude that the generated instruments are valid for all
six models and endogeneity is not a concern. An interaction of two ‘non-endogenous’
regressors cannot itself be endogenous. Hence, the endogeneity test results verify the
robustness of the analyses done, in turn confirming the moderating relationship between
firm profitability, OM elasticity, and OM-spillover elasticity.
Table 3.7. Instrumental Variables Regression Results
Inventory
ROA ROS
Hansen's J statistic
df
p-value

15.3
10
0.12

Sourcing Lead Time Volume Flexibility
ROA

15.6
10
0.11

16.0
10
0.10

ROS
15.5
10
0.11

ROA
14.4
10
0.16

ROS
13.8
10
0.18

3.7. Discussion
First, the existence spillovers of operational-knowledge in terms of inventory, sourcing
lead time, volume flexibility is confirmed using formal empirical methods. Second, it is
confirmed that firms in fact differ in their ability to make use of their internal operational
capabilities as well as the external spillovers of operational-knowledge. Third, statistical
evidence was found that the relationship between OM elasticity and firm performance is in
an inverted U-shaped form. Furthermore, it is shown that operational spillovers interact
with OM elasticity such that operational spillovers are only beneficial to firms that are
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lacking in operational knowledge resources. Counterintuitively, the results suggest that
firms can even be hurt financially from learning from operational spillovers. As shown in
Figures 3.8-3.13, the firm the is itself lacking in operational capabilities can move closer
to an optimal capability level by gaining additional capabilities via spillovers. However,
operational spillovers hurt all other firms. While on the face this is a counterintuitive result,
it is nevertheless consistent with RBV in that these firms are not lacking in operational
knowledge resources, thus and additional operational knowledge moves them further away
from the optimal level and reduces financial performance. Conversely, firms lacking in
operational capabilities benefit from gaining additional operational knowledge via
spillovers.

3.7.1

Managerial Implications

There are several key managerial insights that stem from this research. First, firm
performance is a function of not just the absolute levels of operational knowledge, but
rather the firm’s internal ability to benefit from these operational-knowledge resources.
Various organizational practices can enhance or diminish the relationship between
operational capabilities and firm profitability thus managers should be cognizant to
supplement their operational models with their internal capabilities. Secondly, any efforts
to improve firm profitability (by changing operational capability levels and/or firm’s
internal OM elasticity) need to be harmonized with their own OM-spillover elasticity and
changes in the amount of the available spillover pool. Firm with excessive operational
capabilities are at greater risk of not reaching their potential in terms of ROA & ROS when
trying to match their absolute levels of operational capabilities to that of the industry leader.
Managerially speaking, firms need to realize that there is no one magic standard to any
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operational capability. Becoming leaner in inventory, achieving shorter lead times, and/or
attaining highest VF does not necessarily give the optimal financial results. Getting more
out of less is not always the only strategy, and that it is also possible to get more out of
more as well. Conversely, less operationally capable firms should increase their internal
capabilities to increase their productivity levels. These findings and recommendations are
customized at the firm level by generating firm-specific values for both elasticities. The
kind of efforts a firm should focus upon based on their individual capabilities are identified.
To conclude, managers should not blindly assume that imitating the industry leader in
terms of operational practices will generate increased financial performance—in fact this
research shows that the opposite almost always occurs.

3.7.2

Theoretical Implications

This work also has academic implications. First, majority of the OM empirical research on
US manufacturing firms thus far has evaluated only the ‘mean’ response of a set of
explanatory inputs on firm’s financial and/or operational performance across a given
sample of firms. The empirical assumption made in prior research is that all firms behave
in the same way. The utility and advantages of the application of random coefficient models
(RCM) in predicting firm-level differences are demonstrated. Since firm-specific
elasticities are obtained from financial data, they can be calculated for any firm, even those
that exist outside the study sample. Such an approach can aid in developing the theoretical
interface between strategy and OM, and open doors to eliciting more practical implications
of that research (Alcácer et al., 2013).
Second, the introduction of operational-knowledge type of spillovers enriches the
spillover literature in general. Majority of the past studies have focused on knowledge
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spillovers and innovativeness in the context of R&D to the point that external knowledge
was only viewed in the form of R&D or patents. R&D can be performed in any sector or
division of the firm, not necessarily limited to the manufacturing division. However, there
is much knowledge to be gained from operational models of different firms. Finally, this
research provides support for the idea of resource orchestration and/or curatorship (Breton‐
Miller and Miller, 2015; Grewal and Slotegraaf, 2007; Paeleman and Vanacker, 2015).
While it is typically suggested within the RBV framework that “more is better”, resource
orchestration/curatorship perspectives suggest that what firms do with those resources is at
least as important as which resources it has. These results highlight that only firms which
are resource constrained are benefitted by obtaining additional resources via spillovers.
While when firms have a sufficient level of resources, the imperative should then shift
towards an optimal orchestration of those resources (e.g. moving their OM elasticity to
zero) and not simply on obtaining additional resources.

3.7.3

Limitations and Directions for Future Research

Like any other empirical study doing exploratory work, ours is not beyond limitations.
First, the OM-spillover pools were generated from the spillovers available from firms
within the same industry as that of the focal firm. However, spillover knowledge can be
obtained from outside the industry as well (Jaffe, 1986). Including spillover knowledge
from other industries would further enrich the findings by building on the current work.
Second, due to limitations of secondary data, the choice of valid exogenous instruments
was limited for both elasticity measures. Instruments were generated from the control
variables instead. Third, Compustat only offers data on publicly-traded firms, so the study
sample does not include private firms. Future studies can look at lifting these restrictions
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and reevaluating the relationship between firm capabilities and firm performance for both
public and private firms. Obtaining data on private firms can be more expensive and timeconsuming since the government does not regulate them. However, few data sources
including Dun & Bradstreet (D&B), ReferenceUSA, PrivCo, Hoover’s etc. provide data
for private firms. Data can also be obtained via company websites, market research reports,
trade publications etc.
It has been shown that outsourcing to firms in other countries can lead to some
firms gathering relatively more spillover benefits; specifically Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) spillovers (Kathuria, 2000). This raises an interesting research possibility as to
whether the extent of operational spillovers differs domestically and internationally. More
importantly, future researchers are encouraged to also explore organizational practices that
impact their capabilities (both OM elasticity and spillover elasticity). For example, crosscooperation between internal divisions, employee mindsets regarding changes in operating
model, organizational mindset about following leader firms, patenting to appropriate
knowledge and fend off imitation etc. are organizational practices that can be further
examined. Such work would promote cross-disciplinary research between OM and
Strategy. This work can also be extended to include non-US manufacturing firms to
promote cross-country comparative research. Another possibility is to explore spillovers
in service industries as they present very different needs and objectives in terms of their
operations. Another research opportunity lies in exploring whether firms should rely more
on operational spillovers, or only confine themselves to their in-house operational
capabilities, or do both. For example, Samsung took a leaf out of Apple’s book and has
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been increasingly outsourcing production in the last few years, instead of investing in
developing internal production capabilities to keep everything in-house (Ross, 2015).

3.8. Conclusion
To conclude, despite certain limitations, an important yet understudied research avenue is
explored in this chapter. Our findings indicate that taking a capability-based perspective
contributes to our understanding of the impact of operational spillovers on firm
profitability. Equally importantly, the idea of operational spillovers also feeds into the
bigger umbrella of the relationship between operational innovation and firm performance.
An important contextual factor that can potentially impact the relationships
explored in this chapter is related to the industry-level environment in which the firm
operates, specifically in terms of the degree of uncertainty created by that environment.
The latter influences a firm’s strategic decisions, as well as its performance (Pagell and
Krause, 2004). The degree of uncertainty in a firm’s external environment has been
measured along three dimensions- munificence, dynamism, and complexity (Pagell and
Krause, 2004). The next chapter examines if the external operating conditions, especially
as they pertain to these different dimensions of uncertainty, enable, or prohibit firms to
benefit from either operational innovation or operational spillovers.
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CHAPTER 4
Examining Contextual Factors of the Relationship between Operational
Spillovers and Financial Performance of Manufacturing Firms
4.1. Introduction
Facing increasingly advancing technology and ever-growing competition, manufacturing
firms continually seek to excel operationally to maintain their position in the market. Firms
need to unceasingly adapt their operational practices to respond to the frequently changing
environmental conditions (Hammer, 2005; Miller and Friesen, 1983). Changes in the
external environment of an industry can be driven by changes in the technological
innovativeness of its firms as well as changes in the market conditions that move an
industry towards either a more stable or a more volatile structure (D'Aveni, 2015; D'Aveni
et al., 2010). Given the role that innovation plays in the competitiveness and subsequent
uncertainty of an industry, this chapter evaluates both industry innovativeness as well as
industry environmental uncertainty as two main components of a firms operating
environment.
Research in strategy strongly advocates the interaction of environmental
conditions, managerial decision-making and firm performance (Miller and Friesen, 1983;
Stevenson et al., 1994). Thus it is suggested that firm performance is dependent not only
on the actions of the firm, but also on the influence of the competitive environment (Grimpe
et al., 2007; Miller and Friesen, 1983). According to the Resource-Based View (RBV), the
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resources and capabilities developed by a firm play a role as to what extent the firm is able
to take advantage of the environmental conditions in which it operates and exploit valuable
knowledge through imitating rival firms (Barney, 2001; García-Sánchez et al., 2017).
Within the RBV domain, this paper draws upon resource orchestration and curatorship
perspectives to tie the role of industry-level environment and operational spillovers to the
financial performance of firms (Breton‐Miller and Miller, 2015; Lavie, 2006; Sirmon et
al., 2007).
Under reasonable and stable levels of market demand, competition, and
technological intensity, firms are not sufficiently compelled to make changes to their
operational practices. For example, an industry comprising a countable few monopolistic
firms, is relatively less complex and less competitive. For example, the airline industry fits
this scenario. Firms within such an industry need to worry less about what their competitors
are doing and will be relatively less compelled to seek outside resources to transform their
operational practices. However, changes in those conditions for example, unpredictable
spikes in market demand, growing uncertainty of resource availability, increase in research
and development (R&D), and/or shortening of product life-cycles can negatively impact
the management of firm resources (Sirmon et al., 2007; Stevenson et al., 1994), thus
compelling firms to seek additional resources. Spillovers represent an effective channel for
acquiring valuable resources and knowledge while circumventing the high associated cost
and time demands to develop operational capabilities in-house (Agrawal et al., 2015;
Cheng and Nault, 2007, 2012; Jaffe, 1986). In this chapter, it is posited that the importance
of operational spillovers increases with increasing levels of uncertainty and technological
innovativeness in the environment. Volatility of the environment incentivizes firms into
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developing the required capabilities to manage operational resources in order to avoid
situations of resource shortages and resource under-utilization (Sirmon and Hitt, 2009;
Sirmon et al., 2007). Hence, it is also posited that changes in environmental conditions
could drive firms into developing capabilities to successfully learn from operational
spillovers, and that firms operating in highly uncertain and highly technologically
innovative environments would possess better-developed capabilities to leverage
operational spillovers (Lichtenstein and Brush, 2001).
Firm performance in terms of inventory, sourcing lead time, and volume flexibility
is a function of both its resources and capabilities to leverage those resources; hence, lower
performance by a firm may not necessarily imply inferior quality of its operational
knowledge resources. It is also possible that the firm has an under-developed capability to
fully exploit its resources leading to lower operational performance, as also suggested by
resource curatorship literature (Breton‐Miller and Miller, 2015). Given this, a firm might
try to exploit operational knowledge that spills over from all kinds of firms in its industry
(including leader and laggards) in case it is able to utilize that knowledge as well (in the
case of leaders) or better (in the case of laggards) than the firm it originated from. A firm
may potentially develop different capabilities to exploit different types of knowledge
spillovers, in this case, spillovers from leader firms and spillover from laggard firms. In
this chapter, they are referred to as leader spillover elasticity and laggard spillover
elasticity respectively depending on the source of the external knowledge. Tying this with
the argument on environmental conditions, this chapter explores if external environment
influences both spillover types differently.
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To summarize, this chapter builds on the framework created in Chapter 3 through
a more granular examination of operational spillovers via leader and laggard spillovers.
The relative impact of leader and laggard spillovers is further examined for generalizability
by exploring how the external environment in which the firm operates influences the
results.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section describes
the framework for testing the phenomenon of leader and laggard spillovers. Section 4.3
builds upon this framework to create the resulting hypotheses. Subsequent sections present
the data, the methodology, and the results. The implications of the impact of the industrylevel environment for future OM research are discussed in the concluding section of the
chapter.

4.2. Theoretical Background on Spillovers
Spillovers have been shown to have both positive and negative performance effects for a
firm (Eeckhout and Jovanovic, 2002; Knott et al., 2009; Spence, 1984). Exploitation of
spillovers by the imitating firm brings down the innovation-related investment costs, as
well as potentially reduces the risk of failure. This, in turn, augments the imitating firm’s
profits. On the other hand, spillovers challenge the monopoly of the innovating firm as they
can diminish the innovative firm’s financial returns from that innovation, in turn
diminishing its incentives to innovate. As such, spillovers are an important determinant of
firm performance, but operational-knowledge spillovers remain an under-studied area.
In Chapter 3 of this dissertation, a theoretical framework explaining the different
types of operational-knowledge spillovers, how they occur, and their impact on
performance was developed and presented. The framework is mathematically summarized
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next by adopting the terminology used by Levin and Reiss (1989) and Knott (2009). The
operating profit is calculated as a function of the focal firm i’s internal operational
capabilities (measured as either inventory investments, sourcing lead time, or volume
flexibility) as well as the external operational-knowledge the focal firm accumulates from
the rival firm within its industry as presented below in equation 1.
𝛾𝛾

𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(1)

where Y is the operating profit of firm i in year t and OM is the internal operational
capability of the firm. S is the entire pool of external operational knowledge available to
the focal firm and is referred to as the spillover pool throughout the chapter. Thus, α is the
elasticity of internal operational capability, OM to operating profit and is referred to as OM
elasticity; while γ is the elasticity of spillover pool, S to operating profit and is referred to
as spillover elasticity throughout the chapter. In other words, OM elasticity gauges the
extent to which an additional unit of operational capability (in terms of inventory
investments, sourcing lead time, and volume flexibility) impacts operating profit. Spillover
elasticity gauges the extent to which an additional unit of the corresponding spillover pool
(in terms of inventory investments, sourcing lead time, and volume flexibility) impacts
operating profit. The term spillovers refer to the overall phenomenon of leakage of
knowledge (in this case, operational knowledge) that is generated by a rival firm to the
focal firm. The developed framework for this chapter does not capture the actual
mechanism by which leaked knowledge transfers from one firm to another. Previous
studies have examined various mechanisms like outsourcing, merger and alliances,
employee mobility between firms etc. and sometimes refer to the actual transfer as
spillovers (Knott et al., 2009; Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003; Song et al., 2003). However,
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identifying actual mechanisms by which external knowledge is transferred is beyond the
scope of this dissertation.
Following the literature on endogenous growth models (Eeckhout and Jovanovic,
2002; Nelson and Winter, 1982), the framework of Chapter 3 assumed that firms are
heterogeneous in nature and that flow of spillovers have a directionality. The assumption
made about the directionality was that the focal firm imitates only the industry leader firm.
That is the industry leader firm generates knowledge that leaks out. The spillover pool for
rest of the firms operating in that industry is their relative operational knowledge to that
leader firm. Recall that the term ‘industry leader’ does not necessarily imply a firm that has
the highest financial performance. In fact, industry leader is characterized in terms of its
standing with respect to inventory, sourcing lead time, and volume flexibility. In terms of
inventory, the industry leader is the firm that has the lowest inventory investments relative
to all other firms in that industry. In terms of sourcing lead time, the industry leader is the
firm that has the shortest lead times relative to all other firms in that industry. In terms of
volume flexibility, a higher value is considered to be better, thus the industry leader is the
firm that has the highest volume flexibility relative to all other firms in that industry.
In this chapter, the aforementioned assumption about directionality is extended to
include industry laggards as another source for operational spillovers. An industry laggard
firm is also a rival to the focal firm just like the leader firm, but lies on the opposite end of
the spectrum. That is, in terms of inventory, the industry laggard is the firm that has the
highest inventory investments relative to all other firms in that industry. In terms of
sourcing lead time, the industry laggard firm has the longest sourcing lead times relative to
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all other firms in that industry. In terms of volume flexibility, the industry laggard is the
firm that has the lowest volume flexibility relative to all other firms in that industry.
Chapter 3 detailed the calculation of the operational capability OM, the spillover
pool S, the elasticity components (α, γ), as shown in equation 1, and how they may together
affect the financial performance (return on assets, ROA and return on sales ROS) of
manufacturing firms. As previously explained, this chapter extends the measurement of
spillover pool (S) to include industry laggards and the resulting changes to the framework
in equation 1 are explained in the following section.

4.2.1

Leader and Laggard Spillover Pool

Previous literature on spillovers has used different mathematical forms to measure the
spillover pool and each has its own set of merits and demerits. Knott in her (2009) paper
describes the most popular forms used and their individual advantages and limitations. In
Chapter 3, the spillover pool available to a firm was calculated using the ‘leader distance’
functional form (Eeckhout and Jovanovic, 2002; Nelson and Winter, 1982). This form
calculates spillover pool as the relative difference in operational knowledge between the
focal firm and the industry leader firm. In this chapter, the functional form is broadened to
include industry laggards as well and is referred to as ‘leader- laggard distance’ (Knott et
al., 2009). This leads us to two different spillover pools now available to the focal firm,
one where the leader is the source called the ‘leader spillover pool’ and one where the
laggard is the source called the ‘laggard spillover pool’. This results in the following
modification to equation 1.
𝛾𝛾

𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿
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(2)

where SD is the leader spillover pool and SG is the laggard spillover pool. Thus, γ
is the elasticity of leader spillover pool with respect to operating profit and is referred to as
leader spillover elasticity throughout the chapter. Similarly, δ is the elasticity of laggard
spillover pool with respect to operating profit and is referred to as laggard spillover
elasticity.

4.3. Hypotheses Development
Per RBV, different firms possess different types and quality of operational-knowledge
resources. This is a necessary but not sufficient condition in RBV for improving firm
performance. Firms also need to develop the ability to bundle different knowledge
resources and successfully employ them in the appropriate contexts to sustain competitive
advantage (Barney and Arikan, 2001; Sirmon et al., 2007). Firms differ in their ability to
assess the correct value of a knowledge resource and then apply them in the right context
(Breton‐Miller and Miller, 2015). This implies that even firms that are lacking in
operational performance (laggards), may have the potential to supply valuable operationalknowledge resources to other relatively better-performing firms in the industry. Laggard
firms may simply not possess a capability level required to successfully exploit their
operational knowledge. Given this, a firm might try to exploit operational knowledge that
spills over from all kinds of firms in its industry (including leaders and laggards) as it might
be able to utilize that knowledge better than the firm it originated from.
In Chapter 3, the existence of an inverted-U relationship between OM elasticity in
terms of operating profit (for inventory, sourcing lead time, volume flexibility) and
financial performance (ROA and ROS) of manufacturing firms was empirically shown.
Evidence for heterogeneity of firms in terms of leader spillover elasticity was also found.
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It was further shown that, for leader spillovers, manufacturing firms with a higher spillover
elasticity benefit financially when complemented by their own OM elasticity, given the
right conditions. Consistent with the breakdown of spillover elasticity in Chapter 3, a
positive (or high) spillover elasticity indicates that operating profit increases (decreases) as
the spillover pool increases (decreases). A firm with a positive spillover elasticity possesses
an enhanced ability to learn from the spillover pool compared to a firm with a negative (or
low) spillover elasticity. This is expected to hold true for each of the two spillover
elasticities i.e. leader and laggard.
Drawing upon the resource curatorship view as explained above, the question that
arises in the context of the current research, then is if the focal firm can distinguish between
leader and laggard spillover pools, and if it possesses varying ability to exploit both types
of operational knowledge. Hence, it is posited that firms differ in their ability to exploit the
leader spillover pools (leader spillover elasticity) vs. its ability to exploit the laggard
spillover pools (laggard spillover elasticity).
Regarding the individual impact of both leader as well as laggard spillover elasticity
on a firm’s financial performance (ROA and ROS), it is posited that firms will financially
benefit from both, when complemented with OM elasticity, per RBV (Barney and Arikan,
2001). It is further expected that the strength of the moderating effect of one elasticity type
on a firm’s financial performance will differ from the other. The focal firm needs to invest
in the accumulated external knowledge resource (leader or laggard) to verify its value,
synchronize it with its other resources, and develop a capability to turn it into operating
profits. For the focal firm to gain financially, the payoff that results from exploiting one
type of knowledge (leader or laggard) should monetarily outweigh the costs incurred by it
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in leveraging its value. However, when the associated costs outweigh the payoff instead,
the firm will experience a decrease in net income, and in turn, ROA and ROS.
More specifically, it is posited that the strength of moderation effect of leader
spillover elasticity will be greater than that of the laggard spillover elasticity because of the
differences in expected payoff vs. associated costs between leader knowledge and laggard
knowledge. Since, industry leaders represent best practices in the industry, the knowledge
that they generate is already established to be valuable. On the other hand, industry
laggards have under-developed operational capabilities in terms of inventory, sourcing lead
times, and volume flexibility. Hence, the knowledge generated via laggards does not reflect
industry best practices and the value is mostly unidentified. This implies that the focal firm
would have to invest more to assess the value of laggard knowledge vs. leader knowledge
and how to better use it, to build a capability (spillover elasticity) around it. Thus, the
difference between the costs and resulting payoff might be relatively higher in the case of
laggard spillover elasticity. In turn, its impact on financial performance (ROA and ROS)
can be reasonably expected to be weaker than that of leader spillover elasticity. This
argument leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: The strength of the moderating effect of leader spillover elasticity on the
inverted-U relationship between OM elasticity (in terms of inventory,
sourcing lead time, volume flexibility) and financial performance of
manufacturing firms is greater than that of the moderating effect of laggard
spillover elasticity.
The next two sets of hypotheses are aimed at testing how industry-specific
characteristics are linked to the relative importance of both leader and laggard spillover
elasticity for reaping financial returns.
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In Hypothesis 2, it is posited that the impact of both leader and laggard spillover
elasticity changes with the degree of environmental uncertainty at the industry level. The
concept of environmental uncertainty comes from the field of strategy and is measured as
a composite across the three dimensions of munificence, dynamism, and complexity
(Boyd, 1995; Dess and Beard, 1984). Munificence measures a firm’s access to resources
and opportunities to financially grow in the industry in which it operates. Deficiency of
resources increases uncertainty in the environment; hence, munificence is inversely
proportional to environmental uncertainty. For example, the computer industry is relatively
more munificent than steel industry because of its higher availability of resources (Boyd,
1995). Dynamism, on the other hand, is directly proportional to environmental uncertainty.
Dynamism gauges the degree of volatility or turbulence of the environment in which the
firm competes i.e. higher level of dynamism indicates higher levels of environmental
volatility or uncertainty. For example, an industry where market demand changes
frequently and unpredictably will be considered more dynamic than one with a stable
demand over long periods of time. The third element creating environmental uncertainty is
complexity. Complexity pertains to the concentration of firms in an industry and the
heterogeneity between them. An industry with a few large monopolistic firms would be
considered less complex compared to an industry with a high number of competitors
ranging from large incumbents to new entrants. A higher complexity (or industry
concentration) indicates higher uncertainty. Taken together, these three factors reflect the
levels of competition, unpredictability, and volatility in the industry’s environment.
Previous literature across disciplines has frequently looked at how the uncertainty
of the environment in which a firm operates influences a firm’s strategic decisions, as well
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as its performance (Sirmon et al., 2007). For instance, munificence, dynamism, and
complexity were found to significantly impact the relationship between operational slack
in terms of inventory and safety violations made by a firm (Wiengarten et al., 2017).
Kovach et al. (2015) also found that operational slack improved performance of firms
operating in unstable (more dynamic) environments. RBV emphasizes on building
resources to sustain competitive advantage, and firms often look towards other rival firms
to acquire new and improved knowledge especially when internal development is
inadequate and/or takes longer (King et al., 2003). A strong focus on external knowledge
and resources is more common in uncertain environments where competition levels are
high and time is not luxury. For example, firms that invest heavily in technology; and
operate in highly munificent and dynamic environments are more prone to getting acquired
by a rival firm, to access its technology and expertise, compared to those operating in stable
environments (Heeley et al., 2006). Market concentration (or complexity) has been shown
to impact the performance sensitivity to both leader and laggard R&D spillovers in the
banking industry (Knott et al., 2009). Recognizing the importance of both internal as well
as external knowledge, as laid out by RBV, and the past research on the influencing effects
of environmental uncertainty; it is posited the firms will value external knowledge more
under highly uncertain environments. Whereas in more stable and certain environments,
firms are not sufficiently incentivized to look beyond in-house resources for increasing
operational excellence. When operating in highly uncertain environments, firms are
expected to try even harder to capitalize on external operational-knowledge resources to
improve their operational practices, and financial outcomes (Sirmon et al., 2007). In order
to do so, firms would need to strengthen their internal capability of successfully learning
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from the available spillover pools (both leader and laggard). Those firms that are able to
do so, and are able to successfully complement the external resources with their internal
operational capabilities are expected to perform better financially (Breton‐Miller and
Miller, 2015). Taken together, the following hypothesis is proposed:

Hypothesis 2a: The higher the environmental uncertainty of the industry in which the
manufacturing firm operates, the stronger is the moderating effect of
leader spillover elasticity on the inverted-U relationship between OM
elasticity and financial performance (in terms of inventory, sourcing lead
time, volume flexibility).
Hypothesis 2b: The higher the environmental uncertainty of the industry in which the
manufacturing firm operates, the stronger is the moderating effect of
laggard spillover elasticity on the inverted-U relationship between OM
elasticity and financial performance (in terms of inventory, sourcing lead
time, volume flexibility).
The last hypothesis is aimed at examining if the level of innovativeness of an
industry influences how firms within that industry benefit (or suffer) from leader and
laggard spillovers. Innovation does not happen in a vacuum and spillovers help firms in
acquiring new sources of knowledge and expertise which is essential to developing new
and improved products (Jaffe, 1998). This makes the level of innovativeness as an industry
characteristic particularly relevant to the study of operational spillovers. Highly innovative
industries are synonymous to rapid technological advancements (Thornhill, 2006). This is
because firms operating in highly innovative industries need to continuously innovate and
introduce new and better products to the market, or else they will perish (Greenhalgh and
Rogers, 2010; Scheck and Glader, 2009; Sood and Tellis, 2009). To do so, they can be
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expected to require higher amounts of new and improved knowledge and expertise. These
firms are faced with increased time pressures, shorter product life-cycles (Mackelprang et
al., 2015), higher levels of competition, unpredictability, and volatility since new products
and ideas need to be introduced at a much faster pace. Firms are expected to continuously
improve their existing pool of resources as well as their internal capabilities to maintain
their competitive edge. This pressure is substantially greater for firms operating in highly
innovative industries given the aforementioned characteristic. One way to reduce time and
cost demands is to exploit external knowledge resources that spill-over from rival firms.
Per hypothesis H1, firms are expected to exploit different levels of operational knowledge
and develop internal capabilities to learn from both leader and laggard spillover pools. It is
now posited that the hypothesized effects in H1 will be stronger in the case of highly
innovative industries compared to less innovative industries. To conclude, the following
hypothesis is proposed:

Hypothesis 3a: The higher the industry innovativeness in which the manufacturing firm
operates, the stronger is the moderating effect of leader spillover
elasticity on the inverted-U relationship between OM elasticity and
financial performance (in terms of inventory, sourcing lead time, volume
flexibility).
Hypothesis 3b: The higher the industry innovativeness in which the manufacturing firm
operates, the stronger is the moderating effect of laggard spillover
elasticity on the inverted-U relationship between OM elasticity and
financial performance (in terms of inventory, sourcing lead time, volume
flexibility).
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4.4. Data and Measures
The dataset used for this chapter is the same as that created in Chapter 3 i.e. financial data
of US manufacturing firms (with SIC codes in the range of 2000 and 3999) collected over
the period 1990-2016 from COMPUSTAT. The final data set consists of 220 industries
and 5668 firms, with a grand total of 66,569 firm-year observations. Tables 4.1 and 4.2
present the sample distribution with respect to industry at the two-digit level and time in
years respectively. The creation of measures is discussed next.
Table 4.1. Sample Distribution by Industry

SIC

N

Percent of Data

20
3,798
21
206
22
794
23
1,551
24
834
25
904
26
1,623
27
1,662
28
10,010
29
1,143
30
1,710
31
495
32
1,009
33
2,383
34
2,178
35
9,082
36
12,656
37
3,555
38
9,402
39
1,574
Total N 66569
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5.71
0.31
1.19
2.33
1.25
1.36
2.44
2.5
15.04
1.72
2.57
0.74
1.52
3.58
3.27
13.64
19.01
5.34
14.12
2.36
100

Table 4.2. Sample Distribution by Time in Years

Year

N

Percent of Data

1990
2,337
1991
2,507
1992
2,690
1993
2,859
1994
2,975
1995
3,185
1996
3,303
1997
3,257
1998
3,233
1999
3,124
2000
2,950
2001
2,777
2002
2,682
2003
2,577
2004
2,519
2005
2,447
2006
2,378
2007
2,267
2008
2,208
2009
2,157
2010
2,077
2011
2,010
2012
1,953
2013
1,923
2014
1,863
2015
1,720
2016
591
Total N 66,569

4.4.1

3.51
3.77
4.04
4.29
4.47
4.78
4.96
4.89
4.86
4.69
4.43
4.17
4.03
3.87
3.78
3.68
3.57
3.41
3.32
3.24
3.12
3.02
2.93
2.89
2.8
2.58
0.89
100

Dependent Variables and Control Variables

To calculate firm-specific elasticities, the dependent variable used is firm’s operational
performance, which is operationalized as Operating Profit (OP). Operating profit is
calculated as the difference between a firm’s revenues and its cost of goods sold (COGS).
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For testing the hypotheses, the dependent variable used is firm financial performance,
which is measured in two ways (a) Return on Sales (ROS), and (b) Return on Assets (ROA).
ROS is calculated as net income divided by total sales, and ROA is calculated as net income
divided by total assets. All three variables were winsorized (95 5 percentile) to remove
outliers. Finally, the following variables are used as firm-level controls. Net property, plant,
and equipment is used as a proxy for firm capital, and number of employees is used as a
proxy for labor. Third, a one-year lagged value of R&D expenditure is included to account
for the potential lag between innovation initiatives (as reflected by R&D investment) and
realization of financial profits (Knott, 2008). Fourth, Leverage, which is calculated as total
liabilities divided by total assets of a firm i in year t, is included. Table 4.3 shows the
descriptive statistics of the aforementioned variables.
Table 4.3. Descriptive Statistics

4.4.2

Variable

Obs

Mean

SD

ln(Capital)
ln(Labor)
ln(R&D)
ln(OP)
Leverage
ROS
ROA

48,798
48,798
48,798
48,798
48,712
48,797
48,797

3.538
-0.027
-0.900
4.140
0.514
-0.056
-0.019

2.568
1.977
5.377
2.127
0.521
0.286
0.176

Median
3.460
-0.089
1.080
4.117
0.464
0.030
0.033

Min

Max

-6.215 12.517
-6.908 6.414
-9.210 9.549
-0.794 9.175
0.007 62.721
-1.605 0.235
-0.790 0.201

Operational-Capability Measures

The three operational-capability measures (OM), inventory investments (INV), sourcing
lead time (SLT), and volume flexibility (VF) are operationalized in the same manner as in
Chapter 3.
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4.4.3

Operational-Knowledge Spillover Pool

Taking the example of inventory (INV), industry leader will have the minimum inventory
investments, min(INV), and the industry laggard will have the maximum inventory
investments, max(INV). So, for a focal firm i within an industry y (at the 4-digit SIC level)
in year t, the leader spillover pool is the difference between the focal firm i and the industry
leader in terms of the inventory investments i.e. INViyt - min(INV)yt. The laggard spillover
pool is then calculated as max(INV)yt - INViyt. The leader and laggard spillover pools for
SLT are calculated in a similar fashion. In terms of volume flexibility, a higher value is
considered to be better, thus the industry leader and the industry laggard swap positions.
So, the leader spillover pool is calculated as max(VF)yt - VFiyt and the laggard spillover
pool is calculated as VFiyt - min(VF)yt.

4.4.4

OM Elasticity and Spillover Elasticity

Firm-specific OM elasticities and spillover elasticities for each of three operationalcapability measures (INV, SLT, and VF) were calculated using the procedure described in
Chapter 3 by means of random-coefficient modeling (RCM). Section 4.5.1 provides the
RCM results and the descriptive statistics for both elasticities.

4.4.5

Environmental Uncertainty

The degree of uncertainty in the external environment was measured across three
dimensions-munificence, dynamism, and complexity in line with Boyd (1995). For an
industry y in year t, munificence and dynamism were obtained by regressing annual
industry sales over a five-year period. The slope coefficient thus derived was used as a
measure of munificence, and the corresponding standard error of that coefficient was used
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as a measure of dynamism (Boyd, 1995; Wiengarten et al., 2017). Scores for munificence
and dynamism were missing for 10,681 observations in the data. Higher level of
munificence is indicative of an environment where firms have access to more opportunities
and resources to grow financially. Higher level of dynamism is indicative of higher levels
of environmental volatility/uncertainty. Finally, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
was used to operationalize complexity (Wiengarten et al., 2017). For an industry y in year
t, the squared values of market share in terms of sales is calculated for each firm in that
industry, and then summed to calculate HHI. HHI score was missing for 13 observations
in the data. HHI ranges from zero to one. HHI scores close to one imply lower market
concentration (i.e. countable few monopolistic firms) in that industry and so lower
complexity. Scores closer to zero imply higher concentration with several competing firms
and thus higher complexity. An average of all three dimensions was taken to arrive at a
single composite measure of environmental uncertainty. To do so, first, the direction of all
three dimensions needed to be altered such that a lower value on the composite measure
indicated lower levels of uncertainty and a higher value indicated a higher level of
uncertainty. So, the munificence and HHI scores were multiplied by (-1) to alter their
direction. This means that now a low munificence would indicate low uncertainty;
dynamism remains same in that lower value indicates low uncertainty; and a low HHI
indicates low complexity, in turn, low uncertainty. Next, all three dimensions were
standardized by year. The composite measure for environmental uncertainty was only
calculated if values for all three dimensions were present and considered missing
otherwise. Table 4.4 presents the descriptive statistics for the three dimensions and the
composite measure of environmental uncertainty for the entire sample.
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Table 4.4. Descriptive Statistics for Environmental Variables

Variable
Munificence
Dynamism
Complexity
Environmental Uncertainty
Industry Innovativeness

4.4.6

Obs

Mean

SD

Min

Max

55,888 0.000 1.000 -11.260
21.953
55,888 0.000 1.000 -1.177
32.645
66,556 0.000 1.000 -4.630
1.350
55,888 0.003 0.533 -2.202
15.968
64,750 19.791 36.388
0.000 1014.340

Industry Innovativeness

R&D expenditure has been widely considered as an indicator of knowledge creation and
an input to the process of innovation (Hirschey et al., 2012). Past research has used R&D
spending as a way to measure the level of innovativeness at both the firm and industry level
(Han et al., 2013; Heeley et al., 2007; Lantz and Sahut, 2005). Hence, in this chapter, R&D
intensity is used to measure level of innovativeness of an industry. For an industry y in
year t, industry innovativeness is calculated as the median value of R&D intensity for all
firms in that industry. R&D intensity at the firm level in year t is calculated as R&D
expenditure per firm employee (Wiengarten et al., 2017). Table 4.4 presents the descriptive
statistics for industry innovativeness for the entire sample.

4.5. Analysis and Results
The entire analysis is done separately for each of the three operational measures (INV,
SLT, and VF). The analysis begins by first calculating the firm-specific values for both
OM elasticity; and leader and laggard spillover elasticity. The results for each of
hypotheses is discussed subsequently.
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4.5.1

Calculation of Firm-Specific Elasticities

Stata’s linear-mixed-model command was used to run RCM in order to generate firmspecific elasticities. The procedure as outlined in Chapter 3 was followed. A separate model
was run for each operational measure (INV, SLT, and VF). Capital, labor, and one-year
lagged value of R&D expenditure were used as control variables. The model includes both
the leader (SD) and laggard (SG) spillover pools and thus a separate spillover elasticity is
calculated for each of the two pools, referred to as the leader spillover elasticity (γ) and the
laggard spillover elasticity (δ) respectively. Table 4.5 shows the RCM results for INV,
SLT, and VF. Table 4.5 only provides information about the direct/average component of
OM elasticity; and the leader and laggard spillover elasticity.
Table 4.5. RCM Results

DV = Ln(OP)
Variables
Ln(Capital)

(1)

(2)

(3)

OM = INV OM = SLT OM = VF
0.190***
0.079***
0.180***
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.008)

Ln(Labor)

0.670***
(0.010)

0.581***
(0.011)

0.690***
(0.013)

Ln(Lagged R&D)

0.051***
(0.003)

0.034***
(0.002)

0.058***
(0.003)

Ln(OM)

-0.174***
(0.013)

-0.302***
(0.011)

0.016
(0.014)

Ln(Leader Spillover Pool)

0.016*
(0.007)

0.055***
(0.008)

0.002
(0.004)

Ln(Laggard Spillover Pool)

-0.029***
(0.005)

-0.005**
(0.002)

-0.030***
(0.006)

3.027***
(0.030)

3.447***
(0.025)

3.520***
(0.036)

48201

48798

26125

Constant
N
*

p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; Standard errors are in parentheses.
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To verify that these effects differ across firms, the variance of the direct component
was checked for statistical significance. Stata reports these statistics postestimation. For
each of the three measures (INV, SLT, and VF), the variance for the direct component of
OM elasticity was found to be statistically significant with a p-value<0.001 (t-statistic for
INV = -41.5, for SLT = -46.94, for VF = -28.09). Similarly, the variance for the direct
component of the corresponding leader spillover elasticity was found to be statistically
significant with a p-value<0.001 (t-statistic for INV = -43.57, for SLT = -13.13, for VF =
-48.34). Finally, the variance for the direct component of the corresponding laggard
spillover elasticity was also found to be statistically significant with a p-value<0.001 (tstatistic for INV = -40.88, for SLT = -68.29, for VF = -15.53). Next, for each of the three
operational measures (INV, SLT, and VF), firm-specific elasticities were calculated. The
descriptive statistics for the three elasticities for each of the three operational measures are
shown in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6. Descriptive Statistics for Firm-Specific Elasticities

Elasticities

Obs

Mean

SD

Min

Max

Model 1- Inventory (INV)
OM Elasticity

48,201 -0.181 0.165 -1.032 1.300

Leader Spillover Elasticity

48,201

0.015 0.068 -0.546 0.675

Laggard Spillover Elasticity 48,201 -0.030 0.068 -0.509 0.633
Model 2- Sourcing Lead Time (SLT)
OM Elasticity

48,798 -0.316 0.208 -1.517 1.698

Leader Spillover Elasticity

48,798

0.054 0.024 -0.136 0.485

Laggard Spillover Elasticity 48,798 -0.007 0.027 -0.284 0.219
Model 3- Volume flexibility (VF)
OM Elasticity

26,125
101

0.016 0.114 -0.870 0.642

Leader Spillover Elasticity

26,125

0.002 0.060 -0.527 0.535

Laggard Spillover Elasticity 26,125 -0.030 0.015 -0.145 0.088

For example, in the case of inventory (Model 1 in Table 4.5), the inventory
elasticity of a firm is its ability to generate operating profit from its own inventory
investments and it ranges from -1.032 (lowest) to 1.3 (highest). The leader inventoryspillover elasticity ranges from -0.546 (lowest) to 0.675 (highest). The histograms for all
the three firm-specific elasticities were also drawn to verify firm heterogeneity in terms of
these three elasticities, but are not shown here in the interest of brevity. The reported t-test
results along with the histograms, and the results from Table 4.6. collectively verify that
there is considerable variance across firms in terms of all three elasticity types. Consistent
with the results from Chapter 3, all three elasticities are negative for a subset of firms in
the sample, and positive for the rest. A negative elasticity value is referred to as low
elasticity and a positive elasticity value is referred to as high elasticity from here onwards.

4.5.2

Moderating Effect of Leader and Laggard Spillover Elasticity

To test the first hypothesis H1, an OLS regression was run as shown in equation 3, with a
double-clustered robust error structure (Cameron et al., 2011; Mackelprang and Malhotra,
2015). Firm size, R&D, leverage, time, and industry (4-digit level) effects were included
as control variables.
Yit = β1 ln(X1)it + β2 X2it + β3 (X2*X2)it + β4 X3it + β5 (X2*X3)it + β6
(X2*X2*X3)it + β7 X4it + β8 (X2*X4)it + β9 (X2*X2*X4)it + β10
Ln(L)it + β11 Ln(R)it-1 + β12 Ln(Z)it + β13 (no. of years) + industry
dummies + εit

(3)
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where Y is the financial performance (ROA/ROS) of firm i in year t, X1 is one of
the three operational measures, X2 is the corresponding OM elasticity of that operational
measure, X3 is the leader spillover elasticity, X4 is the laggard spillover elasticity, Ln(L)
is Ln(#employees) used as a proxy for firm size, R is the one-year lagged R&D value, and
Z denotes leverage. H1 results for both ROA and ROS are summarized in Table 4.7.
Table 4.7. Regression Results for Hypothesis 1

(4)

(5)

(6)

OM = INV

(7)

OM = SLT

(8)

(9)

OM = VF

Variables
ROA
ROS
ROA
ROS
ROA
ROS
***
***
***
***
***
Ln(Lagged R&D) -0.004
-0.007
-0.004
-0.008
-0.002
-0.004***
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.001)
No. of Years

-0.002***
(0.000)

-0.001
(0.001)

-0.003*** -0.003***
(0.000)
(0.001)

-0.000
(0.001)

0.001
(0.001)

Ln(Labor)

0.031***
(0.002)

0.052***
(0.004)

0.004
(0.003)

0.025***
(0.005)

0.022***
(0.001)

0.031***
(0.002)

Leverage

-0.020
(0.012)

-0.026
(0.014)

-0.078**
(0.027)

-0.088**
(0.030)

-0.076*** -0.092***
(0.017)
(0.018)

Ln(OM)

-0.004
(0.003)

0.050***
(0.009)

-0.031*** -0.031*** -0.067*** -0.107***
(0.003)
(0.004)
(0.005)
(0.009)

OM Elasticity

-0.143*** -0.265***
(0.017)
(0.035)

-0.101*
(0.048)

-0.067
(0.085)

OM Elasticity^2

-0.307*** -0.587*** -0.219*** -0.473***
(0.051)
(0.089)
(0.033)
(0.064)

-0.096
(0.142)

-0.531
(0.289)

Leader ES

-0.139**
(0.043)

-0.262**
(0.085)

-0.025
(0.100)

-0.174
(0.208)

0.041
(0.044)

0.077
(0.082)

OM Elasticity*
Leader ES

0.078
(0.084)

0.101
(0.155)

-0.735*
(0.366)

-1.225
(0.746)

0.574***
(0.137)

1.020**
(0.323)

OM Elasticity^2*
Leader ES

0.718***
(0.128)

1.189***
(0.232)

1.551***
(0.196)

3.054***
(0.444)

0.607
(0.315)

1.428*
(0.685)

-0.038
(0.024)
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-0.085
(0.047)

Laggard ES

-0.098**
(0.034)

-0.150*
(0.064)

0.311***
(0.082)

0.795***
(0.191)

0.165
(0.175)

0.240
(0.320)

OM Elasticity*
Laggard ES

-0.111
(0.114)

-0.163
(0.220)

0.916***
(0.253)

1.849***
(0.522)

0.240
(0.911)

2.749
(1.553)

OM Elasticity^2*
Laggard ES

0.039
(0.161)

0.079
(0.296)

-0.929**
(0.356)

-1.664*
(0.728)

0.774
(1.858)

2.204
(3.351)

N

48128

48128

48711

48711

26085

26085

*

p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; Standard errors are in parentheses and are two-way cluster robust.
ES=Spillover Elasticity

Results of industry dummies are not shown in the interest of brevity. The Variance
Inflation Factor (VIF) for all models was either less than or equal to 5.83. Wald tests of the
relevant coefficients were also performed to confirm that there is a significant difference
between the moderating effect of leader spillover elasticity and that of laggard spillover
elasticity on the quadratic association between OM elasticity and financial performance
(ROA and ROA), for each of the three operational measures. Table 4.8 presents the Wald
test results of the relevant coefficients.
Table 4.8. Wald Test Results for Hypothesis 1

OM = INV

OM = SLT

OM = VF

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

Leader ES = Laggard ES

-0.04

-0.11

-0.34

-0.97

-0.12

-0.16

OM Elasticity*Leader ES
= OM Elasticity* Laggard ES

0.19

0.26

-1.65

-3.07

0.33

-1.73

OM Elasticity^2*Leader ES
= OM Elasticity^2* Laggard ES

0.68

1.11

2.48

4.72

-0.17

-0.78

Coefficients

Difference estimate = leader coefficient-laggard coefficient. A positive value implies that leader coefficient
is larger in magnitude. Values in bold are significant at the 5% level. The rest are not significant.
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For example, in the case of INV and ROA (Model 4 in Table 4.7), the interaction
effect of leader spillover elasticity with the quadratic term of inventory elasticity is
significantly different than that of laggard spillover elasticity, as shown in bold. The
difference between the two coefficients is 0.68 (=0.718-0.039). Wald test results indicate
that there is a statistically significant difference (at p-value <0.05) between leader and
laggard spillover elasticity for INV and SLT for both ROA and ROS; however, not so for
VF. Also, for INV and SLT, the moderating impact of leader spillover elasticity is stronger
than that of the laggard spillover elasticity. Hence, Wald test results support H1 for INV
and SLT, but not for VF. The interpretation of the H1 results for each of the three measures
is discussed next.

4.5.2.1 Inventory (INV)
Models 4 and 5 (ROA & ROS respectively) present the results for the moderating effect of
both leader and laggard types of inventory-spillover elasticity. The interaction of leader
spillover elasticity with the quadratic term of inventory elasticity is significant with a pvalue < 0.001. The interaction of laggard spillover elasticity with the quadratic term of
inventory elasticity is however not significant for both ROA and ROS. Although, per Wald
test results in Table 4.8, the said coefficients are significantly different from each other.
Also, the strength of moderation effect of leader spillover elasticity is greater than that of
laggard spillover elasticity. Hence, H1 is supported. Graphically the interaction effects for
leader spillover elasticity are presented in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 for ROA and ROS
respectively.
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Figure 4.1. Plot: DV = ROA, OM = INV, and Leader Spillover Elasticity

Figure 4.2. Plot: DV = ROS, OM = INV, and Leader Spillover Elasticity
The results for leader spillover elasticity are consistent with those in Chapter 3.
That is the impact of leader spillover elasticity varies depending on the firm’s position on
the inverted-U curve of inventory elasticity. Not all firms benefit from an increased ability
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to learn from leader inventory spillover pool as explained in Chapter 3. The interaction
effects for laggard spillover elasticity are presented in Figures 4.3 and 4.4 for ROA and
ROS respectively.

Figure 4.3. Plot: DV = ROA, OM = INV, and Laggard Spillover Elasticity
In the case of laggard spillover elasticity, the figures indicate that, contrary to leader
spillover elasticity, position of the firm on the inverted-U curve of inventory elasticity is
not relevant. There is a difference between firms with low and high laggard spillover
elasticity. Firms that increasingly learn from laggard spillover pools perform worse than
those that do not. This implies that learning to increase inventory via laggard spillover pool
hurts all firms and decreases their financial performance. A possible explanation for this is
the difference in the payoff vs. costs associated. The costs of imitating laggard knowledge
are outweighing its potential benefits on this side of the curve. Unless the financial benefits
from building and utilizing the capability of laggard spillover elasticity more than cover
those costs, these firms would experience net loss. Firms with well-developed (or high)
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laggard spillover elasticity are incurring even more costs than benefits from laggard
knowledge and hence, performing worse than those with low laggard spillover elasticity.

Figure 4.4. Plot: DV = ROS, OM = INV, and Laggard Spillover Elasticity
Finally, these results are consistent across ROA and ROS except that in the case of
ROS, (a) relatively more positive returns are realized overall, and (b) the difference
between low and high spillover elasticity is stronger.

4.5.2.2 Sourcing Lead Time (SLT)
Models 6 and 7 (ROA & ROS respectively) present the results for the moderating effect of
both leader and laggard types of SLT-spillover elasticity. The moderation effect for leader
spillover elasticity is strongest in the case of SLT compared to inventory and VF, as
observed in Table 4.7. The interaction of leader spillover elasticity with the quadratic term
of SLT elasticity is significant with a p-value < 0.001 for both ROA and ROS. The
interaction of laggard spillover elasticity with the quadratic term of SLT elasticity is also
significant with a p-value < 0.05, unlike inventory.
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The results show that, both the leader and laggard spillover elasticities individually
moderate the quadratic association between SLT elasticity and financial performance.
Moreover, per Wald test results in Table 4.8, the said coefficients are significantly different
from each other. Also, the strength of moderation effect of leader spillover elasticity is
greater than that of laggard spillover elasticity. Hence, H1 is supported. The results are
consistent across ROA and ROS except that in case of ROS, the overall results are more
pronounced.

Graphically, the interaction effects for leader spillover elasticity is

presented in Figures 4.5 and 4.6 for ROA and ROS respectively.

Figure 4.5. Plot: DV = ROA, OM = SLT, and Leader Spillover Elasticity
The results for leader spillover elasticity are consistent with those in Chapter 3.
That is, the impact of leader spillover elasticity varies depending on the position of the firm
on the inverted-U curve of SLT elasticity. Not all firms benefit from an increased ability
to learn from their SLT spillover pool.
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Figure 4.6. Plot: DV = ROS, OM = SLT, and Leader Spillover Elasticity
For laggard spillover elasticity, the interaction effects are presented in Figures 4.7
and 4.8 for ROA and ROS respectively. The graphs indicate that unlike inventory, firm
behavior in fact depends on its position on the inverted-U curve of SLT elasticity. Also,
the interaction effects of laggard spillover elasticity results are opposite to those of leader
spillover elasticity. Within firms lying on the left side of the curve, firms with lower laggard
spillover elasticity perform better than those with higher spillover elasticity. Firms on the
left side have longer SLT and learning from laggard spillover pool implies that these firms
further lengthen their SLT, hence firms with an ability to successfully exploit laggard
spillover pool perform relatively worse. Firms on the right side behave in the opposite way.
Since these firms have increasingly shorter SLT, those with an ability to successfully learn
from laggard spillover pool are prevented from becoming excessively lean in terms of SLT
and hence experience relatively better financial outcomes.
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Figure 4.7. Plot: DV = ROA, OM = SLT, and Laggard Spillover Elasticity

Figure 4.8. Plot: DV = ROS, OM = SLT, and Laggard Spillover Elasticity
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4.5.2.3 Volume Flexibility (VF)
Models 8 and 9 (ROA & ROS respectively) present the results for the moderating effect of
both leader and laggard types of VF-spillover elasticity. The interaction of leader spillover
elasticity with the quadratic term of VF elasticity is not significant for ROA but is
significant for ROS with a p-value less than 0.05. The interaction of laggard spillover
elasticity with the quadratic term of VF elasticity is not significant for both ROA and ROS.
Hence, overall the moderation effect of both leader and laggard spillover elasticity on the
quadratic association between OM elasticity and financial performance is not statistically
significant. Furthermore, per Wald test results in Table 4.8, there is no significant
difference between the moderating effects of leader and laggard spillover elasticity. Hence,
no support is found for H1a and H1b in the case of VF.

4.5.3

Moderating Effect of Environmental Uncertainty

To test H2, OLS regression was run with a double-clustered robust error structure. Firm
size, R&D, leverage, time, and industry (4-digit level) effects were included as control
variables. A traditional three-way interaction model to test the moderating effect of
environmental uncertainty was showing high multi-collinearity. Hence, median-split
method was used instead on the base model described in equation 3 (Mackelprang et al.,
2015; Wiengarten et al., 2014). Environmental uncertainty was split at its median value
into two groups (low and high) and analysis was done separately for each group. Both
groups were later compared if the relevant coefficients are significantly different using
Wald tests. Table 4.9 summarizes results using ROA as the dependent variable. Taking the
example of inventory, Model 10 in Table 4.9 shows the results for low environmentaluncertainty and Model 11 shows the results for high environmental-uncertainty group.
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Table 4.9. Regression Results for Hypothesis 2, DV = ROA

(10)
DV = ROA

(11)

(12)

OM = INV
Low

High

(13)

OM = SLT
Low

High

(14)

(15)

OM = VF
Low

High

Ln(Lagged R&D) -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.000)
#Years

-0.001*
(0.001)

-0.001
(0.001)

-0.003***
(0.001)

-0.002**
(0.001)

0.000
(0.001)

-0.000
(0.001)

Ln(Labor)

0.032***
(0.002)

0.034***
(0.002)

0.001
(0.003)

0.008*
(0.003)

0.021***
(0.002)

0.022***
(0.002)

Leverage

-0.013
(0.008)

-0.040*
(0.018)

-0.098***
(0.022)

-0.062*
(0.029)

-0.062*** -0.096***
(0.021)
(0.019)

Ln(OM)

-0.011*
(0.005)

0.004
(0.004)

-0.037*** -0.030*** -0.068*** -0.064***
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.007)
(0.006)

OM Elasticity

-0.187*** -0.125***
(0.023)
(0.019)

OM Elasticity^2

-0.398*** -0.241*** -0.246*** -0.205***
(0.071)
(0.053)
(0.043)
(0.038)

-0.053
(0.033)

-0.035
(0.025)

-0.145
(0.051)

-0.067
(0.060)

0.056
(0.150)

-0.197
(0.179)

Leader ES

-0.115*
(0.054)

-0.131*
(0.053)

0.095
(0.125)

-0.107
(0.134)

-0.010
(0.063)

0.072
(0.055)

OM Elasticity*
Leader ES

0.198
(0.156)

0.068
(0.068)

-0.554
(0.471)

-0.827*
(0.398)

0.255
(0.235)

0.716***
(0.144)

OM Elasticity^2*
Leader ES

1.001***
(0.249)

0.593***
(0.133)

1.602***
(0.241)

1.528***
(0.246)

0.313
(0.601)

0.892*
(0.369)

Laggard ES

-0.048
(0.052)

-0.131***
(0.039)

0.322**
(0.118)

0.363***
(0.099)

0.086
(0.191)

0.174
(0.242)

OM Elasticity*
Laggard ES

-0.157
(0.154)

-0.048
(0.150)

0.881*
(0.422)

1.027***
(0.267)

-1.221
(0.869)

1.133
(1.095)

OM Elasticity^2*
Laggard ES

0.240
(0.280)

0.049
(0.179)

-1.642***
(0.436)

-0.813
(0.444)

-0.010
(2.018)

1.269
(2.395)
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N

20262
*

21913

20528

22096

12420

13659

p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; Standard errors in parentheses and are two-way cluster robust.
ES=Spillover Elasticity

Table 4.10 summarizes results using ROS as the dependent variable. Taking the
example of inventory again, Model 16 in Table 4.10 shows the results for the low group
and Model 17 shows the results for the high group. Results of industry dummies are not
shown in the interest of brevity. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for all models in both
tables was either less than or equal to 6.
Table 4.10. Regression Results for Hypothesis 2, DV = ROS

(16)
DV = ROS

(17)

(18)

OM = INV
Low

High

(19)

OM = SLT
Low

High

(20)

(21)

OM = VF
Low

High

Ln(Lagged R&D) -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.004*** -0.005***
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
#Years

-0.000
(0.001)

0.000
(0.001)

-0.002*
(0.001)

-0.001
(0.001)

0.001
(0.001)

0.001
(0.001)

Ln(Labor)

0.052***
(0.004)

0.059***
(0.004)

0.015**
(0.005)

0.036***
(0.007)

0.029***
(0.002)

0.034***
(0.003)

Leverage

-0.019
(0.010)

-0.050*
(0.021)

-0.110***
(0.023)

-0.074*
(0.033)

-0.078*** -0.114***
(0.022)
(0.019)

Ln(OM)

0.038**
(0.012)

0.068***
(0.010)

-0.040*** -0.026*** -0.107*** -0.105***
(0.005)
(0.006)
(0.014)
(0.011)

OM Elasticity

-0.334*** -0.252***
(0.047)
(0.041)

OM Elasticity^2

-0.700*** -0.531*** -0.492*** -0.474***
(0.129)
(0.101)
(0.085)
(0.072)

Leader ES

-0.252*
(0.120)

-0.256*
(0.107)

-0.083
(0.061)

-0.023
(0.273)
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-0.086
(0.050)

-0.335
(0.273)

-0.142
(0.086)

-0.012
(0.119)

-0.255
(0.383)

-0.724*
(0.335)

0.013
(0.103)

0.108
(0.108)

OM Elasticity*
Leader ES

0.336
(0.275)

0.075
(0.150)

-1.099
(1.005)

-1.474*
(0.744)

0.422
(0.359)

1.321**
(0.377)

OM Elasticity^2*
Leader ES

1.742***
(0.445)

1.048***
(0.280)

3.117***
(0.526)

3.189***
(0.521)

1.222
(1.025)

1.840*
(0.753)

Laggard ES

-0.110
(0.096)

-0.187*
(0.082)

0.898***
(0.245)

0.876***
(0.225)

0.031
(0.290)

0.330
(0.496)

OM Elasticity*
Laggard ES

-0.214
(0.283)

-0.085
(0.301)

2.273**
(0.864)

1.784***
(0.526)

0.146
(1.696)

4.377*
(1.793)

OM Elasticity^2*
Laggard ES

0.617
(0.556)

-0.027
(0.357)

-3.292***
(0.891)

-1.275
(0.897)

1.837
(3.666)

2.327
(4.218)

N

20262

21913

20528

22096

12420

13659

*

p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; Standard errors in parentheses and are two-way cluster robust.
ES=Spillover Elasticity

Wald tests of the relevant coefficients were performed to confirm the moderating
effect of environmental uncertainty for each of the three operational measures. For
example, in the case of inventory and ROA as the dependent variable, the relevant
coefficients were compared between Models 10 and 11 to check if H2 was supported and
so on. Results are summarized in Table 4.11. The moderating relationship between both
leader and laggard spillover elasticity and the quadratic association between OM elasticity
and financial performance does not differ between low and high environmental-uncertainty
groups for INV and VF. In case of SLT and ROS, only the interaction between laggard
spillover elasticity and the quadratic term of OM elasticity is significant. However, with
ROA as the dependent variable, the same effect is not significant. As such, Wald tests failed
to support H2 for both ROA and ROS overall. To conclude, failure to find support for H2
indicates that the results for H1 are robust to the effects of the environmental uncertainty.
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Table 4.11. Wald Test Results for Hypothesis 2

Low vs. High Group
Coefficients

OM = INV

OM = SLT

OM = VF

ROA

ROS

ROA

ROS

ROA

ROS

OM Elasticity

0.062

0.082

0.018

-0.003

0.078

0.130

OM Elasticity^2

0.157

0.169

0.041

0.018

-0.253

-0.469

Leader ES

-0.016

-0.004

-0.202

-0.312

0.082

0.095

OM Elasticity*Leader ES

-0.130

-0.261

-0.273

-0.375

0.461

0.899

OM Elasticity^2*Leader ES

-0.408

-0.694

-0.074

0.072

0.579

0.618

Laggard ES

-0.083

-0.077

0.041

-0.022

0.088

0.299

0.109

0.129

0.146

-0.489

2.354

4.231

-0.191

-0.644

0.829

2.017

1.279

0.490

OM Elasticity*Laggard ES
OM Elasticity^2*Laggard ES

Difference estimate= coefficient of high group- coefficient of low group. Values in bold are significant at
the 5% level. All other values are not significant.

4.5.4

Moderating Effect of Industry Innovativeness

To test H3, OLS regression was run with a double-clustered robust error structure. Firm
size, R&D, leverage, time, and industry (4-digit level) effects were included as control
variables. A traditional three-way interaction model to test the moderating effect of
industry innovativeness was showing high multi-collinearity. Hence, median-split method
was used instead on the base model described in equation 3, similar to H2 (Mackelprang
et al., 2015; Wiengarten et al., 2014). Industry innovativeness was split at its median value
into two groups (low and high) and analysis was done separately for each group. Both
groups were later compared if the relevant coefficients are significantly different using
Wald tests. Table 4.12 summarizes results using ROA as the dependent variable. Taking
the example of inventory, Model 22 shows the results for low industry-innovativeness
group and Model 23 shows the results for high industry-innovativeness group.

116

Table 4.12. Regression Results for Hypothesis 3, DV = ROA

(22)
DV=ROA

(23)

(24)

OM = INV
Low

(25)

OM = SLT

High

Low

High

(26)

(27)

OM = VF
Low

High

Ln(Lagged R&D) -0.001*** -0.009*** -0.001*** -0.009***
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.001)

-0.001*
(0.000)

-0.004***
(0.001)

#Years

-0.001
(0.000)

-0.002*** -0.002*** -0.004***
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.001)

-0.000
(0.001)

-0.000
(0.001)

Ln(Labor)

0.019***
(0.002)

0.043***
(0.002)

0.006***
(0.002)

0.006
(0.003)

0.013***
(0.001)

0.029***
(0.002)

Leverage

-0.021
(0.012)

-0.019
(0.012)

-0.111***
(0.015)

-0.063*
(0.030)

-0.082***
(0.016)

-0.070**
(0.023)

Ln(OM)

-0.003
(0.004)

-0.009*
(0.004)

-0.016*** -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.078***
(0.002)
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.007)

OM Elasticity

-0.085*** -0.183***
(0.019)
(0.024)

-0.055*
(0.027)

OM Elasticity^2

-0.175*** -0.370*** -0.295*** -0.206***
(0.048)
(0.074)
(0.046)
(0.036)

-0.042
(0.028)

0.051
(0.047)

-0.175**
(0.066)

-0.238**
(0.089)

-0.212
(0.195)

Leader ES

0.013
(0.054)

-0.206***
(0.059)

-0.009
(0.079)

-0.100
(0.157)

-0.040
(0.039)

0.050
(0.076)

OM Elasticity*
Leader ES

-0.194
(0.142)

0.215*
(0.107)

0.258
(0.351)

-0.834*
(0.396)

0.357
(0.214)

0.640***
(0.166)

OM Elasticity^2*
Leader ES

0.153
(0.230)

0.966***
(0.182)

0.728***
(0.117)

1.723***
(0.247)

0.181
(0.359)

0.808
(0.508)

-0.155***
(0.039)

-0.069
(0.052)

-0.031
(0.104)

0.485***
(0.103)

-0.337*
(0.151)

0.793*
(0.366)

OM Elasticity*
Laggard ES

0.045
(0.168)

-0.211
(0.181)

0.503
(0.407)

0.877**
(0.288)

1.106*
(0.556)

0.898
(1.522)

OM Elasticity^2*
Laggard ES

0.404
(0.334)

0.099
(0.239)

0.517
(0.434)

-1.323***
(0.400)

-0.899
(1.908)

0.457
(2.003)

Laggard ES
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N

22160
*

25238

22487

25446

12292

13487

p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; Standard errors in parentheses and are two-way cluster robust.
ES=Spillover Elasticity

Table 4.13 summarizes the results using ROS as the dependent variable. Taking the
example of inventory again, Model 28 shows the results for the low group and Model 29
shows the results for the high group. Results of industry dummies are not shown for both
ROA and ROS in the interest of brevity. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for all models
was either less than or equal to 6.6.
Table 4.13. Regression Results for Hypothesis 3, DV = ROS

(28)
DV=ROS

(29)

(30)

OM = INV
Low

(31)

OM = SLT

High

Low

High

(32)

(33)

OM = VF
Low

High

Ln(Lagged R&D) -0.002*** -0.015*** -0.003*** -0.017***
(0.000)
(0.002)
(0.000)
(0.002)

-0.001**
(0.000)

-0.009***
(0.001)

#Years

-0.001
(0.000)

-0.001
(0.001)

-0.002*** -0.004***
(0.000)
(0.001)

0.000
(0.001)

0.001
(0.001)

Ln(Labor)

0.029***
(0.003)

0.074***
(0.005)

0.016***
(0.004)

0.038***
(0.007)

0.018***
(0.002)

0.044***
(0.003)

Leverage

-0.025*
(0.012)

-0.027
(0.016)

-0.110***
(0.012)

-0.077*
(0.035)

-0.091*** -0.089***
(0.012)
(0.025)

Ln(OM)

0.016*
(0.007)

0.057***
(0.010)

-0.016*** -0.040*** -0.046*** -0.137***
(0.003)
(0.006)
(0.005)
(0.013)

OM Elasticity

-0.138*** -0.344***
(0.031)
(0.049)

OM Elasticity^2

-0.365*** -0.705*** -0.525*** -0.485***
(0.080)
(0.121)
(0.100)
(0.068)

Leader ES

0.098
(0.087)

-0.406***
(0.118)

-0.093*
(0.046)

-0.022
(0.135)
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-0.096
(0.054)

-0.430
(0.325)

0.113
(0.066)

-0.192
(0.123)

-0.344*
(0.136)

-0.812*
(0.380)

-0.050
(0.054)

0.105
(0.138)

OM Elasticity*
Leader ES

-0.352
(0.214)

0.368*
(0.180)

0.626
(0.617)

-1.496
(0.818)

0.206
(0.374)

1.190**
(0.407)

OM Elasticity^2*
Leader ES

-0.529
(0.424)

1.729***
(0.303)

0.823***
(0.202)

3.725***
(0.529)

2.004*
(0.788)

1.287
(1.157)

Laggard ES

-0.219**
(0.076)

-0.113
(0.097)

-0.013
(0.200)

1.190***
(0.251)

-0.730***
(0.217)

1.357
(0.728)

OM Elasticity*
Laggard ES

0.108
(0.293)

-0.287
(0.357)

1.257
(0.825)

1.613**
(0.575)

1.906*
(0.884)

4.628
(2.663)

OM Elasticity^2*
Laggard ES

0.537
(0.583)

0.186
(0.453)

1.339
(0.862)

-2.611***
(0.774)

8.328*
(4.187)

0.852
(4.262)

N

22160

25238

22487

25446

12292

13487

*

p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; Standard errors in parentheses and are two-way cluster robust.
ES=Spillover Elasticity

Wald tests of the relevant coefficients were performed to confirm the moderating
effect of industry innovativeness for each of the three operational measures. Results are
summarized in Table 4.14.
Table 4.14. Wald Test Results for Hypothesis 3

Low vs. High Group
Coefficients

OM = INV

OM = SLT

OM = VF

ROA

ROS

ROA

ROS

ROA

ROS

OM Elasticity

-0.098

-0.206

0.013

-0.003

-0.226

-0.305

OM Elasticity^2

-0.195

-0.340

0.089

0.040

0.026

-0.468

Leader ES

-0.219

-0.504

-0.091

-0.408

0.090

0.155

OM Elasticity*Leader ES

0.409

0.720

-1.092

-2.122

0.283

0.984

OM Elasticity^2*Leader ES

0.813

2.258

0.995

2.902

0.627

-0.717

Laggard ES

0.086

0.106

0.516

1.203

1.130

2.087

OM Elasticity*Laggard ES

-0.256

-0.395

0.374

0.356

-0.208

2.722

OM Elasticity^2*Laggard ES

-0.305

-0.351

-1.840

-3.950

1.356

-7.476

Difference estimate = coefficient of high group- coefficient of low group. Values in bold are significant at
the 5% level. All other values are not significant.
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For each of the three measures, Wald test results were consistent across ROA and
ROS. The moderating effects of both leader and laggard spillover elasticity differs
significantly between low and high groups for SLT but not for VF. In the case of INV, the
moderating effects of only the leader spillover elasticity differs across the two groups. To
summarize, Wald tests provide support to H3 for SLT, but failed to support H3 for VF. For
INV, Wald tests only support H3a. Overall, the results for ROS are consistent with that of
ROA in the two tables except for the small variation between the actual coefficient
estimates and statistical significances. ROA regression results are slightly more
conservative than those of ROS. Hence, interaction plots and interpretation are presented
using only ROA results in the interest of brevity. The interpretation of these results for each
operational measure is discussed next.

4.5.4.1 Inventory (INV)
Models 22 and 23 in Table 4.12 present the results for the low and high industryinnovativeness group respectively for ROA. Models 28 and 29 in Table 4.13 present the
results for the low and high industry-innovativeness group respectively for ROS. In Table
4.12, the interaction of leader spillover elasticity with the quadratic term of inventory
elasticity is significant for the high industry-innovativeness group (p-value < 0.001), but
not for the low industry-innovativeness group. The interaction of laggard spillover
elasticity with the quadratic term of inventory elasticity is not statistically significant for
both groups. This is consistent with H1 results where the moderation effect of laggard
spillover elasticity was not statistically significant to begin with. Wald tests came out
statistically significant for leader spillover elasticity but not for laggard spillover elasticity.
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The results show that, only the moderation effect of leader spillover elasticity differs
significantly between low and high industry-innovativeness groups. Graphically the
interaction effects for leader spillover elasticity are presented in Figures 4.9 and 4.10 for
low and high industry-innovativeness group respectively.

Figure 4.9. Plot: OM = INV, Leader Spillover Elasticity, and Low Innovativeness
For the high industry-innovativeness group (refer to Figure 4.10), results match
those for H1 (refer to Figure 4.1), only more pronounced. Firms on the left side benefit
from learning from leader spillover pool while firms on the right side are financially hurt
when they rely more on leader spillover pools. For the low innovativeness group; however,
no evidence is found of the moderating effect of leader spillover elasticity. All firms
perform the same regardless of their ability to learn from the leader spillover pool. This
indicates that firms in less innovative industries are (a) least inclined to exploit external
operational knowledge since they are not confronted with the same time and market
pressures as firms operating in highly innovative industries, and/or (b) all have comparable
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abilities to learn from leader’s best practices and lack incentive to improve on this ability.
Hence, H3a is supported. The Wald tests are not significant for laggard spillover elasticity
results failing to support H3b.

Figure 4.10. Plot: OM = INV, Leader Spillover Elasticity, and High Innovativeness

4.5.4.2 Sourcing Lead Time (SLT)
Models 24 and 25 in Table 4.12 present the results for the low and high industryinnovativeness group respectively for ROA. Models 30 and 31 in Table 4.13 present the
results for the low and high industry-innovativeness group respectively when for ROS. The
interaction of leader spillover elasticity with the quadratic term of SLT elasticity is
significant with a p-value < 0.001 for both low and high industry-innovativeness groups,
unlike inventory. The interaction of laggard spillover elasticity with the quadratic term of
SLT elasticity is statistically significant with a p-value < 0.001 only for the high industryinnovativeness group. Wald tests came out statistically significant at a p-value < 0.05 for
interactions with leader spillover elasticity as well as those with laggard spillover elasticity.
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Graphically the interaction effects for the high industry-innovativeness group are
presented in Figures 4.11 and 4.12.

Figure 4.11. Plot: OM = SLT, Leader Spillover Elasticity, and High Innovativeness

Figure 4.12. Plot: OM = SLT, Laggard Spillover Elasticity, and High Innovativeness
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For the high industry-innovativeness group, results match those for H1 for both
leader and laggard spillover elasticity. The financial benefit from leader spillover pool is
dependent on the position of the firm on the quadratic curve and this dependency is most
pronounced in the left side of the curve. Firms on the left side benefit from learning from
leader spillover pool in that they can reduce their long lead times while firms on the rightside experience little difference. In the case of laggard spillover elasticity, both sides of the
curve show substantial difference between firms that are able to successfully learn and
those that are not. Unlike leader spillover elasticity, firms on right side of the curve
financially gain from learning from laggard spillover pool. Laggard pool is indicative of
SLT practices that lead to longer lead times. Hence, firms on the right side that are already
too lean in terms of SLT actually benefit from the knowledge provided by laggard spillover
pools. Plots for the low industry-innovativeness group are shown in Figures 4.13 and 4.14.

Figure 4.13. Plot: OM = SLT, Leader Spillover Elasticity, and Low Innovativeness
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Figure 4.14. Plot: OM = SLT, Laggard Spillover Elasticity, and Low Innovativeness
For leader spillover elasticity in the low industry-innovativeness group, the same
effects are evident albeit in a much weaker intensity compared to the high group. The
difference between low and high leader spillover elasticity is almost non-existent,
especially on the right side of the curve. Firms on the left side benefit slightly for high
leader spillover elasticity. In the case of laggard spillover elasticity (refer to Figure 4.14),
all firms perform the same regardless of their ability to learn from the laggard spillover
pool. This indicates that firms in less innovative industries are not focusing as much on
knowledge generated outside the firm as they face lesser competition and time pressures to
build on the work in-house (Mackelprang et al., 2015). The interaction plots across the two
groups together with the Wald test results, imply that both leader and laggard spillover
elasticity moderation effects are stronger in the high industry-innovativeness group. This
lends supports to both H3a and H3b.
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4.5.4.3 Volume Flexibility (VF)
Models 26 and 27 in Table 4.12 present the results for the low and high industryinnovativeness group respectively for ROA. Models 32 and 33 in Table 4.13 present the
results for the low and high industry-innovativeness group respectively for ROS. The
interaction of leader spillover elasticity with the quadratic term of VF elasticity is not
statistically significant for either of the two groups. Same is true for laggard spillover
elasticity. Furthermore, Wald tests were also not statistically significant suggesting that
there is no difference between the low and high innovativeness groups in terms of the
moderating effects of both leader and laggard spillover elasticity. Hence, the results do not
support either H3a or H3b.

4.6. Discussion
Table 4.15 summarizes the results for the three sets of hypotheses.
Table 4.15. Summary of Findings

Hypothesis

OM = INV

OM = SLT

OM = VF

H1

H1: supported

H1: supported

H1: not supported

H2

H2: not supported

H3

H3a: supported
H3b: not supported

H2: not supported H2: not supported
H3a: supported
H3b: supported

H3: not supported

First, the existence of laggard operational spillovers in terms of inventory, sourcing
lead time, and volume flexibility is confirmed using formal empirical methods. Second, it
is confirmed that manufacturing firms in fact differ in their ability to turn leader and laggard
spillovers into operating profits. Third, even after the inclusion of laggard spillover
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elasticity, the overall interpretation for the moderating impact of leader spillover elasticity
remains consistent with that in Chapter 3 across all three operational measures. That is,
leader spillovers are only beneficial to firms that are lacking in operational-knowledge
resources, regardless of the environmental conditions. Fourth, the moderating effects of
both leader and laggard spillover elasticity are robust to the level of uncertainty in the
industry-level environment. However, industry innovativeness does play an influencing
role in the relationship between operational spillovers and financial performance. Overall,
the results, though not fully supported and counterintuitive in places, are consistent with
resource orchestration view.

4.6.1

Managerial Implications

The concept of leader and laggard spillovers has multiple implications for managers. First,
consistent with the work in Chapter 3, firm performance is a function of not just the
absolute levels of operational knowledge, but rather the firm’s internal ability to benefit
from these operational-knowledge resources. Managers need to not only be able to
correctly assess the value of their external operational resources, but also use them in the
correct context by orchestrating them with their existing operational capabilities. Simply
stated, managers must be skilled in how they use the resources they possess, independent
of how those resources were obtained. Second, industry laggards also have the potential of
generating useful operational knowledge. Third, firms do not exploit leader’s operational
knowledge and laggard’s operational knowledge in the same way, as demonstrated by the
varying levels of leader and laggard spillover elasticities. The fourth implication pertains
to augmenting financial performance from leader and laggard spillover elasticities. As such
and somewhat counterintuitive, managers should not simply seek to imitate leader firms.
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Additionally, managers should be cognizant that while laggard firms may possess
operational knowledge its value is largely unknown and payoffs are uncertain. Arguably,
there are two possibilities behind this. It is possible that laggard firms have valuable
operational knowledge but are unable to fully realize the benefits of their knowledge. It is
also possible that laggards, while possessing adequate levels of capabilities, simply possess
an inferior quality of knowledge; hence, end up lagging behind. For a firm to be successful,
correct recognition of inferior knowledge is crucial so as not to waste precious money and
resources in imitating inferior knowledge (Knott et al., 2009). Fifth, managers need to pay
special attention to industry innovativeness because the impact of operational spillovers
increases with increasing levels of innovativeness. In terms sourcing lead time, both leader
and laggard spillovers become increasingly relevant with increasing levels of
innovativeness. In terms of inventory, successfully imitating leaders is more crucial under
high-innovativeness conditions, not so for imitating laggards. Finally, environment
uncertainty does not seem to interact with the moderating effects of operational spillovers
which implies that managerial decisions regarding operational spillovers need not be
dependent on the levels of environmental uncertainty.

4.6.2

Theoretical Implications

This research builds the theoretical interface between operations management (OM) and
strategy. First, further empirical support is provided to one of the foundational pieces of
RBV, that firms are heterogeneous in terms of their capabilities and resources (Barney and
Arikan, 2001). To the best of knowledge, empirical work is scarce on the heterogeneity
aspect specific to operational capabilities in terms of inventory, SLT, and VF of
manufacturing firms. Within RBV, there is dearth of research that explains how firms can
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actually use their unique set of resources and capabilities to create competitive advantage
(Sirmon et al., 2007). With this work, an attempt is made to demonstrate how firms can
orchestrate their different capabilities (OM elasticity and spillover elasticity) to augment
profits. Second, results also provide support for the literature of resource orchestration
and/or curatorship (Breton‐Miller and Miller, 2015; Grewal and Slotegraaf, 2007;
Paeleman and Vanacker, 2015).
Third, it is shown that operational spillovers do have directionality, and
manufacturing firms seem to exploit operational knowledge from both industry leaders and
laggards, in terms of inventory and sourcing lead time. Hence, there is much more
granularity to be gained from delving deeper into the source of operational spillovers.
Lower performance by a laggard firm in terms of inventory, SLT, and VF does not
necessarily mean that it possesses inferior operational knowledge. Finally, this work ties
together several research streams- operational practices; resource and capability
orchestration; innovativeness, external environment, and firm performance. External
environment in terms of industry innovativeness is found to be strongly associated with the
exploitation of operational spillovers. Finally, the results of this essay further strengthen
the results of essay two as the effect of operational spillovers on performance are
insensitive to environmental uncertainty, suggesting a degree of generalizability with
respect to environmental uncertainty.

4.7. Conclusion
To conclude this chapter advances the understanding of operational spillovers coupled with
the influence of environment-specific characteristics. The work done does have some
limitations. First, the study sample does not include private firms. The spillover pool, S, is
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modeled such that only the spillovers from within the industry are considered. Future
research can extend this work to include inter-industry spillovers. This work can also be
extended to examine if using a different functional form, other than the leader-laggard
distance form, influences the results. Another profitable research opportunity lies in
exploring other types of operational spillovers beyond those of inventory, SLT, and VF.
One interesting finding of this research is the possession of potentially valuable operational
knowledge in laggard firms. This is counterintuitive in that laggard firms are presumed to
have inferior knowledge (Knott et al., 2009). Such a finding raises an interesting potential
research avenue related to why laggard firms are laggards? Do laggard firms lack specific
capabilities or is their knowledge simply not as broad as leader firms? A similar line of
inquiry could be made for leader firms. Hence, the field of OM can benefit from more
research on leveraging operational knowledge and capabilities. Sirmon et al. (2007) have
called for more research on ways of leveraging resources in general. To conclude, it is
hoped that future scholars will find the concept of operational spillovers useful and
continue to enrich it with further research.
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusion
The complexity and ambiguity of converting new ideas into successful products and
processes has provided operations management researchers a challenging yet fruitful
research domain. Additional challenges facing researchers in this area is the lack of data
for adequately measuring technological innovation and also the multi-disciplinary and
multi-dimensional nature of innovation causing the need to use multiple different methods
for research on this topic. Despite these challenges, the opportunity for research in this area
is significant given its critical importance to most firms competing in today’s complex
operational environment. In its totality, this dissertation grapples with these challenging
issues to delve deeper into technological innovation in general and more specifically
operational knowledge spillovers.
The second chapter of this dissertation concentrates on the overarching construct
of technological innovation and its inherent complexity. The contradictory findings on its
impact on firm performance are quantitatively aggregated by using empirical data from
relevant published studies from thirteen major journals across various research disciplines.
Analysis via multivariate meta-analytic methodology sought to reconcile the relationship
between technological innovation and firm performance. The results indicate a significant
and positive relationship. The rate and direction of the impact of technological innovation
on firm performance is however influenced by various contextual factors at play.
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Additionally, in the second chapter, the role of country-level contextual factors
across the dimensions of culture and formal institutions is examined. Results show that
firms operating in nations with a collectivistic mindset and/or lower tendency to avoid
uncertainty reap better financial outcomes from innovation. Moreover, contrary to past
research in this area, innovation endeavors by firms operating in nations with strong patent
protection do not result in financial gains. Furthermore, two interesting patterns are
revealed in the research done on technological innovation thus far. First, majority of the
research done has assumed firms to be homogenous in nature, and second, imitation of
rival firm(s) as a strategy for transforming financial performance is equally popular as inhouse innovation among firms. Hence, the role of imitation of rival firm(s) as an
influencing factor is explored in the analysis conducted in Chapters 3 and 4, under the
assumption that firms are in fact heterogenous in their ability to financially benefit from
innovation.
Imitation of rival firm(s) occurs by exploiting the innovative knowledge that leaks
out of those firm(s) and this phenomenon is referred to as spillovers. In the third chapter of
this dissertation, the concept of spillovers of operational knowledge, called operational
spillovers is introduced. These operational spillovers are characterized in terms of
inventory, sourcing lead time, and volume flexibility. Chapter 3 verifies the existence of
operational spillovers in manufacturing firms across the three dimensions of inventory,
lead time, and flexibility. The moderating role on the performance sensitivity of firms to
their internal innovative operational practices is also examined. Results show that firms are
indeed heterogenous in nature, and operational spillovers financially benefit only those
firms which have underdeveloped operational capabilities. All other firms are hurt
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financially from operational spillovers, contrary to expectations. Using the resource-based
view (RBV) of a firm, this chapter highlights the importance of learning from operational
spillovers as a capability of a firm to sustain competitive advantage. The results have the
following practical implications. First, firm performance is a function of both the absolute
levels of internal and external operational knowledge as well as the firm’s ability to
successfully exploit these resources. Second, imitation of the industry’s leading firm is not
always the best idea for augmenting financial outcomes, and should be undertaken by firms
keeping in mind their internal capabilities.
In Chapter 4 of the dissertation, external operational knowledge accumulated by a
firm is further separated into leader and laggard spillover pools. The aim is to get a deeper
understanding of the differences in the impact of both leader and laggard spillovers on the
focal relationship studied in Chapter 3. Results indicate that there are significant
differences in the moderating effects of both leader and laggard spillovers in terms of
inventory and sourcing lead time, but not in the case of volume flexibility. The individual
impact of leader and laggard spillovers is further evaluated in the context of industry-level
environment to establish generalizability of results. The degree of environmental
uncertainty and industry innovativeness are used to characterize the external environment
in which the firm operates. Results show that the impact of both leader and laggard
spillovers is insensitive to environmental uncertainty. However, the impact of both
spillovers was found to be more pronounced in highly innovative industries compared to
less innovative industries. These results indicate that (a) not all operational capabilities are
equally relevant and valuable under all environmental conditions, and (b) the external
knowledge gained via operational spillovers is more important in highly innovative
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industries. Hence, firms operating in highly innovative industries are recommended to
focus on developing capabilities to leverage operational spillovers. Taken together, the
essays contained within this dissertation advance the extant understanding related to
technological innovation generally and operational spillovers more specifically. It is
expected that the introduction of the operational-spillover concept in extant literature will
spur further examination into the underlying processes that underpin successful
(unsuccessful) innovation efforts.
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